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THE CONTROVERSY OF CLEMENCY AND
INNOCENCE IN AMERICA
SARAH LUCY COOPER*
DANIEL GOUGH**
INTRODUCTION
Clemency has been embedded in the American criminal justice
system since America was founded.' Justified under a mixture of
retributive, redemptive, and utilitarian principles, 2 "clemency" covers
"a variety of mechanisms an executive can use to remit the
consequences of a crime," 3 including pardons, commutations of
* (Barrister), Senior Lecturer in Law, Centre for American Legal Studies,
Birmingham City University. I would like to thank Dr. Jon Yorke for his valuable
review of this article, Alice Christian for her helpful research, and the scholars at the
2014 U.S. Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences conference and Durham
University PGR conference on Decision-Making and Criminal Justice: National and
International Trends, for allowing me to share earlier drafts. Thanks, also, to Daniel
for being an excellent co-author.
** LL.B, LL.M., Ph.D. student, Birmingham City University.
1. Daniel T. Kobil, How to Grant Clemency in Unforgiving Times, 31 CAP. U.
L. REv. 219, 232 (2003) [hereinafter Kobil, Unforgiving Times] ("Clemency has
been an integral part of the American legal system since our country's founding.").
2. See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 399-400 (2004) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (stressing the importance of applying both retributive and redemptive
principles in executive clemency).
3. Molly Clayton, Note, Forgiving the Unforgivable: Reinvigorating the Use
ofExecutive Clemency in Capital Cases, 54 B.C. L. REv. 751, 754 (2013).
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sentence, reprieves, and the remission of fines and forfeitures. 4
Through these mechanisms, executives and/or administrative bodies
can accomplish such diverse goals as restore civil rights, acknowledge
mitigating circumstances, correct egregious sentences, prevent
deportations, and support political agendas.5 They can also correct the
wrongful conviction of innocents.
In the 1993 case of Herrera v. Collins, the United States Supreme
Court (USSC) placed extreme confidence in the clemency function to
remedy wrongful convictions. 6  In ruling that Herrera's claim of
actual innocence (absent some other procedural violation in his case)
was not a ground for federal habeas relief, the USSC held that: (1)
clemency is the "fail safe" of the criminal justice system;7 (2) state
clemency processes are the proper mechanism for assessing innocence
claims;8 and (3) clemency is the historic remedy for preventing
miscarriages of justice where the judicial process has been exhausted. 9
The Supreme Court decided Herrera just as the American
Innocence Movement was gaining momentum. The year before, in
1992, Barry C. Scheck and Peter J. Neufeld formed The Innocence
Project "to assist prisoners who could be proven innocent through
DNA testing."10 By the end of 1993, one hundred and thirty-five
people had been exonerated," including fourteen whose innocence
had been conclusively proven by post-conviction DNA evidence.12
4. Kathleen (Cookie) Ridolfi & Seth Gordon, Gubernatorial Clemency
Powers: Justice or Mercy, 24 CRIM. JUST. 26, 28 (Fall 2009), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abalpublishing/criminal-justice-section_n
ewsletter/crimjustcjmag_24_3 ridolfi.authcheckdam.pdf
5. Id. (citing grounds for which clemency has been granted).
6. See generally Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
7. Id. at415.
8. Id. at 417.
9. Id. at 412.
10. Mission Statement, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.
org/ about/Mission-Statement.php (last visited May 13, 2014).
11. Browse the National Registry of Exonerations, THE NAT'L REGISTRY OF
EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/browse.aspx
(last visited May 10, 2014).
12. See id. (indicating exonerations based on DNA with a letter "Y" in the
"DNA" column); see also Know the Cases, INNOCENCE PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/Browse-Profiles.php
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Since then, however, a number of disturbing cases-such as those of
Cameron Todd Willinghaml3 and Troy Anthony Davisl4-have
steadily highlighted the inadequacy of clemency in providing relief to
innocent inmates. In spite of presenting significant evidence of
innocence, Willingham and Davis were refused clemency by
governors in Texas and Georgia, respectively, and were executed soon
thereafter.' 5 Concerns about clemency's ability to provide relief to
innocent inmates have been exacerbated by the USSC's decision in
Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard. I6 In Woodard, the USSC
afforded only "minimal" due process protections to defendants in
clemency proceedings and held-in spite of the holding in Herrera
that clemency is the "fail safe" of the criminal justice system-that
clemency proceedings are not "an integral part of the . . . system for
finally adjudicating guilt or innocence of a defendant.""
This article considers to what extent clemency is fit to handle
innocence claims, particularly from the perspective of innocents who
are incarcerated and seeking post-conviction relief. Part I traces the
(last visited May 26, 2014) (listing fourteen exonerations from 1989 through 1992,
all of which were attributed to DNA evidence).
13. See generally David Grann, Trial by Fire: Did Texas Execute an Innocent
Man?, NEW YORKER, Sept. 7, 2009, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/09/07/090907fa fact_grann (discussing
Willingham's conviction, clemency denial, and execution).
14. See STATE BD. OF PARDONS & PAROLES, STATEMENT REGARDING DAvIS
CLEMENCY DECISION (Sept. 20, 2011), available at
http://multimedia.savannahnow.com/media/pdfs/DavisDecisionStatement.pdf
(Georgia Board of Pardons and Parole's statement regarding its decision to deny
clemency for Troy Davis). See generally Kathy Lohr, Georgia is Poised to Execute
Davis, 22 Years Later, NPR (Sept. 21, 2011, 12:01 AM),
http://www.npr.org/2011/09/21/140629240/georgia-is-poised-to-execute-davis-22-
years-later (discussing the debate surrounding the denial of clemency for Davis and
his scheduled execution); Ed Pilkington, Troy Davis Execution: Georgia Pardons
Board Denies Plea for Clemency, GUARDIAN (Sept. 20, 2011),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/201 1/sep/20/troy-davis-execution-pardon-denied
(noting the evidentiary issues which have arisen since Davis's conviction and the
public doubt regarding his guilt). Davis was executed on September 21, 2011. See
id.
15. Grann, supra note 13.
16. Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272 (1997).
17. Id. at 285 (citing Evitts v., Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393 (1985) (quoting
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956))).
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history of clemency and demonstrates how it has never served a
significant legal function or been truly "innocentric" in nature, but
rather was an exercise of political power inherently unfavorable to
innocents. Part II reviews current clemency frameworks across
America and explores the obstacles innocents face when applying for
relief, including a lack of transparency, imbalanced administrative
board compositions, and barriers to meaningful review, including high
eligibility thresholds and unfavorable application procedures. Part III
evaluates the effectiveness of Woodard's minimal due process
standard for protecting against unfair clemency procedures by
reviewing a cohort of cases in which state clemency procedures were
challenged on the basis of unfairness. The cases discussed in Part III
demonstrate that courts are applying Woodard narrowly, and are
generally reluctant to interfere in state clemency processes-an
approach unfavorable to innocents seeking relief through clemency.
Part IV concludes that clemency, to a large extent, is a hostile
environment for innocence claims, given the few historical or
contemporary frameworks dedicated to evaluating innocence claims,
obstacles to meaningful review, antipathetic executive attitudes,
minimal constitutional protection, and courts' reluctance to interfere
with state procedures.
I. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CLEMENCY: A POWER FOR
POLITICAL EXPEDIENCE
This section highlights major landmarks in the evolution of the
clemency power from the theological foundation of mercy to
clemency practices in early America to the eventual thrusting of the
clemency power into the criminal justice system as a mechanism for
identifying wrongful convictions during the "era of innocence." This
examination of the development of clemency exposes it as a political
power, neither designed nor routinely used to remedy wrongful
convictions.
A. God, Ancient Egypt, and Ancient Rome
While American executive clemency is rooted in common law
tradition, the concept of "mercy" can be traced well beyond the
common law era. Unlike the modem clemency power, which is
vested in state officials, the historical foundation of mercy was divine.
58 [Vol. 51
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For example, the ancient Egyptian slaves of Deir El-Medina believed
that blindness was a punishment, which could be withdrawn by the
merciful goddess Meretseger in return for the offender repenting his
sins.18 The first documented human-vested clemency power was in
early Greek democracies, where the power was vested in the supreme
democratic legislature, Ecclesia.19 With the fall of democracy in the
Roman Empire, however, clemency was removed from the people and
vested solely in the Emperor, 20 beginning its journey to the executive
clemency power we have today.
This shift in investiture from the legislature to the Emperor was
important for two particular reasons. First, as Ancient Rome lost its
democratic character and moved toward an autocratic rule, the
potential for tyranny increased. 2 1 As such, several authors have
suggested that the public exercise of mercy was politically essential in
order to offset the newfound "awesome abilities of the state to inflict
harm" 22 and to embed a divine quality in rulers. 23 In fact, Julius
Caesar was known for his repeated acts of mercy toward defeated
opponents,24 with the modern term "clemency" derived from
"Clementia," the goddess of forgiveness and mercy, deified as a
celebrated virtue of Julius Caesar. 25 Second, the exercise of mercy
through clemency came to symbolize the absolute power with which
the Emperor ruled.26 In particular, the act of pardoning placed the
grantor in a position of ruling over the grantee, forcing a defeated
18. BARBARA S. LESKO, THE GREAT GODDESSES OF EGYPT 76 (1999).
19. II ROBERT J. BONNER & GERTRUDE SMITH, THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE FROM HOMER TO ARISTOTLE 253-56 (1938).
20. MELISSA BARDEN DOWLING, CLEMENCY AND CRUELTY IN THE ROMAN
WORLD 13-21 (2005).
21. Id. at 13-21.
22. Id. at 9.
23. Id. at 12.
24. Marcus Tullius Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum [Letters to Atticus] (Latin)
14.22 (L.C. Purser ed., 1965) [hereinafter Letters to Atticus], available at
http://perseus.uchicago.edu/perseus-cgi/citequery3.pl?dbname=PerseusLatinTexts
&getid=1&query-Cic.%20Att.%2014.22 (last visited May 18, 2014).
25. DOWLING, supra note 20, at 19.
26. SUSANNA BRAUND, SENECA: DE CLEMENTIA 32 (2009) ("[Cilementia is an
imperial virtue; when clementia is shown towards fellow-Romans it is testimony of
absolute power.").
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opponent, for example, into a lasting position of weakness. 27 As such,
while the possession of the divine quality of mercy was important to
the general population, the exercise of clemency was deeply resented
within the political class. 2 8  Considering this, few of Caesar's
contemporaries viewed the act of clemency as one of mercy; rather,
clemency was largely regarded as a "manifestation of tyrannical
power" 29 or, at least, as a political tool that "once . . . [it] ceased to
convey the advantage to Caesar, he would drop." 30  It appears,
therefore, that the Roman clemency power was concerned primarily
with political expediency, not considerations of mercy, and certainly
was not used to ensure justice. Furthermore, in that era, the act of
clemency was not designed with the intention of ensuring justice.
Instead, arguably, the power inherent in Roman "clemency" was
derived specifically from the act of granting grace to an individual
who did not deserve or warrant such-an individual the law had every
right to punish, but who was, nevertheless, treated more leniently by
their ruler. As such, mercy could be considered antithetical to
justice.'
Over time, even as the clemency power moved away from the
Emperor and into the hands of judges, it continued to fulfill a
primarily political purpose. 32
27. See, e.g., Letters to Atticus, supra note 24, at 9.7C, available at
http://perseus.uchicago.edu/perseus-cgi/citequery3.pl?dbname=PerseusLatinTexts&
getid=1&query-Cic.%20Att.%209.7C (Caesar suggested the granting of mercy was
necessary for continued victory, stating "we fortify ourselves with mercy and
generosity"); see also David Konstan, Clemency as a Virtue, 100 CLASSICAL
PHILOSOPHY 337, 337 (2005).
28. See Letters to Atticus, supra note 24, at 10.4, available at
http://perseus.uchicago.edu/perseus-cgi/citequery3.pl?dbname=PerseusLatinTexts&
query =Cic.%20Att.%20l0.4&getid=1; see also Konstan, supra note 27.
29. Konstan, supra note 27.
30. DOWLING, supra note 20, at 23.
31. See, for example, AUSTIN SARAT, MERCY ON TRIAL: WHAT IT TAKES TO
STOP AN EXECUTION 69-75 (2005), for a detailed discussion of the relationship
between mercy and justice, and, in particular, justice as a legal concept.
32. See, for example, Pontius Pilate's decision not to grant Jesus clemency
after a popular vote. Matthew 27:15-24.
60 [Vol. 51
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B. Clemency and the Common Law
Although pardons were recorded prior to the Norman conquest of
England, 33 it was not until after 1066 and the Battle of Hastings that
the King's pardon power was codified in the Code of William the
Conqueror. 34 Like in Ancient Rome, exercise of the King's pardon
power was rarely related to considerations of mercy or justice and was
primarily concerned with political and/or economic expediency. For
example, by the time of Henry I, codified laws explicitly allowed the
exchange of pardons for money, 35 and Edward I granted pardons in
exchange for military service. 36
Unlike the Ancient Roman pardon power, however, English
monarchs shared the right to be merciful with Roman Catholic
clergymen, who exercised a divine mercy.37  Although several
monarchs struggled with this sharing of power, it was only following
Henry VIII's split from the Catholic Church that the English
Parliament passed an act granting the King "sole power and
33. See William F. Duker, The President's Power to Pardon: A Constitutional
History, 18 WM. & MARY L. REv. 475, 477 (1977), available at
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2444&context=wmlr
(discussing the early English Kings' versions of clemency).
34. LEGEs HENRI PRIMI [LAWS OF HENRY I] (Latin) § 11(16a), at 115 (L. J.
Downer ed. & trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1971) (Eng.).
35. Id. § 79(2) at 247.
36. Duker, supra note 33, at 478; Stanley Grupp, Some Historical Aspects of
the Pardon in England, 7 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 51, 58 (1963).
37. See Duker, supra note 33, at 487 n.60 (citing An Acte Recontynuyng of
Ctayne Libties and Francheses Heretofore Taken Frome the Crowne [An Act for
Continuing Certain Liberties of the Crown] (Eng.), 27 Hen. 8, c. 24, § 1 (1535)
[hereinafter An Act for Continuing Certain Liberties of the Crown]) (alteration in
original). See generally K. J. KESSELRING, MERCY AND AUTHORITY IN THE TUDOR
STATE 46 (2003), for an examination of the development of the doctrine of the
"benefit of the cloth," which was "based on an ancient custom designed to reserve
churchmen for punishment for the church courts in an age when few save clerics
could enjoyed literacy, the male convict who demonstrated his ability to read was
handed over for the much lighter sanctions of the ecclesiastical jurisdiction." See
also Lesley Skousen, Redefining Benefit of Clergy During the English Reformation:
Royal Prerogative, Mercy, and the State (2008) (unpublished M.A. thesis,
University of Wisconsin), available at http://minds.wisconsin.
edu/handle/1 793/65455.
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auctoritie," which vested the clemency power solely in the monarch.38
The power to grant clemency remained solely the preserve of the
monarch for over two centuries, confirming his or her absolute
sovereignty. 39
Ultimately, a lack of oversight or legal recourse in relation to
grants of clemency played a central role in the fall of this autocratic
regime. In 1678, King Charles II's use of the pardon power to thwart
the intentions of the democratically elected parliament led to a
constitutional crisis. 40 Subsequently, the pardon power was gradually
withdrawn from the monarch and granted to a combination of the
government and parliament, where it remains today. 4 1  As such,
history shows, regardless of where the clemency power has been
vested from the time of ancient Rome to Enlightenment England, one
thing has remained constant: its primary function has been to further
or consolidate a position of power.
This trend continued when clemency "arrived" in America.
C. Clemency in America
This subsection considers the development of the clemency power
in America at the state and federal levels. Although this article
concentrates on state clemency proceedings, an exploration of the
38. An Act for Continuing Certain Liberties of the Crown, supra note 37
(quoted in Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the Pardoning
Power from the King, 69 TEX. L. REv. 569, 586 n.95 (1991) [hereinafter Kobil, The
Quality of Mercy] (describing Parliament's grant to the King of "the [w]hole and
sole power and auctoritie [authority]" to pardon (alteration in original))).
39. See Kobil, The Quality of Mercy, supra note 38, at 586 (referencing E.
COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND:
CONCERNING HIGH TREASON, AND OTHER PLEASE OF THE CROWN, AND CRIMINAL
CAUSES 233 (London, E. & R. Brooke 1797)).
40. Id. at 576; see also Duker, supra note 33, at 487; Brian C. Kalt, Pardon
Me: The Constitutional Case Against Presidential Self-Pardons, 106 YALE L.J. 779,
783-84 (1997).
41. See Noel Cox, The Gradual Curtailment of the Royal Prerogative, 25
DENNING L.J. 1, 2 (2012). Within the British Constitutional Monarchy, the
Government, although made up of members of the parliament, acts as de facto
executive on behalf of the monarch; the parliament in general acts as the highest
legislative authority, checking and debating the work of the Government. See
Parliament and Government, UK PARLIAMENT, http://www.parliament.uk/about/
how/role/parliament-government/ (last visited Dec. 6, 2010).
62 [Vol. 51
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development of the federal clemency power is useful in illustrating the
largely political focus of the clemency power in America. Moreover,
the state and federal powers have taken a similar evolutionary journey.
1. Early American Clemency
With the expansion of the British Colonial Empire, clemency was
often utilized to curry favor with the local, indigenous American
population. 42 As such, the monarch-who remained, at that time, the
sole individual vested with the clemency power-customarily
bestowed on colonial governors the power to grant clemency on his
behalf.43 By 1776, therefore, the concept of clemency was familiar to
the American political system and to the Founding Fathers. Clemency
was understood to be "one of the great advantages of the
monarchy;"44 therefore, it was considered as greatly beneficial in
buttressing the monarchial power the Founding Fathers were trying to
replace.
Following the American Revolution, there was a concerted
attempt among the states to move away from a central executive
power. 45 Consequently, when drafting their constitutions, the
majority of states (eight out of thirteen) moved away from a system of
clemency vested solely in the executive.46 Instead, states vested the
clemency power in either the legislature or a combination of the
legislature and the executive. 47  Thereafter, when the federal
government began codifying the scope of its powers, the two major
plans-the New Jersey Plan and the Virginia Plan-failed to address
the issue of clemency at all.48
42. Kobil, The Quality ofMercy, supra note 38, at 589.
43. See Duker, supra note 33, at 487.
44. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: A
FACSIMILE OF THE FIRST EDITION OF 1765-1769, at 314 (Chi. Univ. Press 1979)
(1769), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/
a2_2 1sl7.html.
45. CHRISTEN JENSEN, THE PARDONING POWER IN THE AMERICAN STATES 10
(Chi. Univ. Press. 1922), available at http://books.google.com (search "Christen
Jensen"; then follow "The Pardoning Power in the American States" hyperlink).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 20-23, 243-
45 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (discussing the Virginia Plan and the New Jersey Plan).
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When clemency was finally considered at the federal level, little
contemplation was given to the prospect of following the states'
practice of limiting the executive clemency power or of placing the
clemency power in the legislature, either solely or jointly with the
executive. 49 Instead, it was Alexander Hamilton's approach-which
almost exactly mirrored the British model as laid out in the Act of
Settlement of 1701-that was adopted.o With Article II of the United
States Constitution stating that "[The President] shall have Power to
grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States,
except in Cases of Impeachment."5 1
Founding Father Alexander Hamilton argued that adopting an
executive-based clemency power would position clemency as a
defense against overbearing law,52 much in the same vein as the
founding spirit of the new Republic. 53 Specifically, Hamilton noted
that the ability to exercise clemency would ensure that citizens are
treated fairly, as a rigid system of justice "would wear a countenance
too sanguinary and cruel."54 During the early years of the American
clemency power, "justice-enhancing" arguments, such as those
proffered by Hamilton, were popularly cited at both the state and the
federal levels as support for vesting an unrestricted power so
centrally. 5
Much like the clemency power in Ancient Rome and England,
however, the true rationale behind such an uninhibited prerogative
was, in practice, primarily justice-neutral and premised on political
expediency.5 6  In light of the weakness of the new Republic, the
ability to exercise leniency for certain crimes was crucial; Hamilton
49. See Duker, supra note 33, at 504.
50. Id. at 501.
51. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
52. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JAMES MADISON, & JOHN JAY, THE FEDERALIST
PAPERS 377 (Garry Wills ed., Bantam 1982) (1787-1788) [hereinafter THE
FEDERALIST].
53. See Duker, supra note 33, at 504 ("The greatest of American liberties has
been the concept of 'checks and balances.' The framers provided for such checks
and limitations on all other powers set forth in the Constitution because they
recognized the 'encroaching nature' of power.").
54. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 52, at 377.
55. Kobil, The Quality ofMercy, supra note 38, at 579, 591.
56. See Duker, supra note 33, at 528-34.
64 [Vol. 51
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suggested that clemency could prove essential to holding the
Confederation together during "seasons of insurrection."57 As such,
the early federal clemency power was most frequently used to mitigate
the effects of punishing popular rebellions, most notably during the
Pennsylvanian Whiskey Rebellion.58 Similarly, Thomas Jefferson
utilized the clemency power to pardon individuals whom the
Federalists had convicted and sentenced under the Alien Sedition Act
in the years prior to their defeat in the election of 1800.59
The largely political nature of the early clemency power is laid
bare when examining the range of crimes pardoned by the first four
Presidents. Of Washington's thirty-one pardons, fifteen related to
treason and six to violations of unpopular taxation.60 Of Adams's
twenty-five pardons, seventeen related to either insurrection or trade
violations.6' Between them, Jefferson and Madison pardoned thirty-
five individuals for desertion and forty-five for violations of revenue
laws.62 These pardons demonstrate that clemency was a powerful
political tool in the early years of the fledgling Republic, which used
to soften the fall-out from unpopular increases in federal taxation and
the centralization of power.63
As the executive-based federal clemency power was effectively
utilized to hold the early Republic together, the "post-independence
Republican faith in legislative bodies soon waned." 64
Consequentially, as state constitutions were ratified, changes were
made so as to move away from vesting the clemency power jointly in
the legislature and the executive and toward the federal approach,
57. Id. at 505.
58. See 1 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS
§ 10, at 173 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897) (Presidential Proclamation of July 10,
1795).
59. Duker, supra note 33, at 530.
60. P.S. Ruckman, Jr., Policy as an Indicator of "Original Understanding":
Executive Clemency in the Early Republic (1789-1817), at 18, available at
http://www.rvc.cc.il.us/faclink/pruckman/pardoncharts/Paper7.pdf (last visited Nov.
16, 2014).
6 1. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy, supra note 38, at 605 (quoting KERMIT
HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 104 (1989)).
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which vested the clemency power solely in the executive. Of the first
thirty-five state constitutions ratified, twenty-six placed the clemency
power in the hands of the Governor alone. 65
During this time, the clemency power-both the federal clemency
power and the power vested in state governors-was rarely, if ever,
used to correct wrongful convictions that occurred against a non-
political backdrop. 66  Seemingly, the strength of early American
clemency was its exercise contrary to justice: relieving law-breakers
from their punishment while reinforcing that the law was effective. 67
Almost fifty years passed before the USSC considered the scope
of the federal pardon power. In the 1833 case of United States v.
Wilson, the USSC considered whether President Jackson's pardon of a
death sentence was valid against a robber who "did not wish ... to
avail himself, in order to avoid [the] sentence . . . ."68 The case
required the Justices to consider from where the seemingly unfettered
pardon power derived.69  Due to scant legal discussion amongst
American courts, Chief Justice John Marshall sought guidance from
English law and found that the presidential pardon was "an act of
grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of
laws," that should be interpreted widely and, to the extent possible,
unregulated by law. 70 As such, the USSC refused to compel Wilson
to accept the pardon and held that the presidential pardon was not
valid as against an unwilling recipient. 7
The breadth of the presidential pardon power was underscored in
Ex Parte Garland, where the USSC found the power to be
"unlimited ... . [A]nd may be exercised at any time .... This power
65. JENSEN, supra note 45, at 10.
66. See Ruckman, supra note 60, at 2 ("Clemency decision have, furthermore,
been intimately connected with (if not the central feature of) some of the most
salient political events in our nation's history including: the Whiskey Rebellion,
Fries Rebellion, the Alien-Sedition Acts, the presidential election of 1801, the War
Between the States and Reconstruction. . .
67. SARAT, supra note 31, at 72.
68. United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. 150, 155 (1833).
69. Id. at 161.
70. Id. at 160.
71. Id. The holding in Wilson was overturned in Biddle v. Petrowich, 274 U.S.
480, 487 (1927), where the Supreme Court held that the presidential pardon could be
enforced upon an unwilling recipient.
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of the President is not subject to legislative control. Congress can
neither limit the effect of [the President's] pardon, nor exclude from
its exercise any class of offenders." 72 Furthermore, the USSC stated
that the legislative inability to regulate the presidential pardon was a
direct result of "the benign prerogative of mercy reposed in [the
President,] . . . [which] cannot be fettered by any legislative
restrictions."7 Notably, although the USSC addressed legislative
interferences with clemency, judicial regulation was almost wholly
ignored.7 4 As such, the question emerged whether such an uninhibited
power could exist within a legal system without being subject to
judicial review.
2. The 20th Century Clemency Power
At the turn of the 20th Century, the clemency power began to
interact more directly with the American criminal justice system. This
subsection will consider how this interaction occurred: first through
clemency's utility to rehabilitative forms of justice, and thereafter with
its opposition to punitive justice. Finally, this section will consider
how the USSC thrust clemency into the forefront of the "era of
innocence."
a. Clemency and Rehabilitative Justice
The emergence of new forms of psychiatry and criminology at the
start of the 20th Century meant that, for the first time, mercy was no
longer merely a political tool, but was actually a way of satisfying
criminal justice policy. In addition to traditional punitive measures, a
strong emphasis was placed on rehabilitation. 7 This trend
"unapologetically reject[ed] an act-and desert-based conception of
justice . . . and wholeheartedly embrace[d] leniency rooted in
compassion."76 Compassionate justice aimed at character reformation
72. Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 380 (1866).
73. Id.
74. SARAT, supra note 31, at 80.
75. See DORIS LAYTON MACKENZIE, SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS IN THE
21ST CENTURY: SETTING THE STAGE FOR THE FUTURE 6 (2001), available at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/189106-2.pdf.
76. SARAT, supra note 31, at 95.
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became a central focus,7 7 and the ability to grant pardons to
rehabilitated individuals began to be used as a tool in the
administration of criminal justice.78 At the state level, clemency
recommendations and decisions moved into the hands of official
administrative boards. Additionally, many states, along with the
federal government, enacted indeterminate sentencing periods with
wide ranging potential sentences, depending upon various factors. 79
There was a culture change toward individualized, less punitive
justice.o
b. The Demise ofRehabilitative Justice and the Rise of "Tough on
Crime " Agendas
In the 1970s, shortly after the clemency power moved into the
mechanics of the criminal justice system, the rationale for its criminal
justice-related use eroded with the perceived failure of rehabilitative
punishment.8 ' Coupled with an increasingly powerful voice of
"victim advocacy," 82 several widely reported incidents of "urban
77. Id.
78. See Gavriel B. Wolfe, Note, I Beg Your Pardon: A Call for Renewal of
Executive Clemency and Accountability in Massachusetts, 27 B.C. THIRD WORLD
L.J. 417,423-24 (2007).
79. MACKENZIE, supra note 75, at 6.
80. Francis A. Allen, Criminal Justice, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative
Ideal, 50 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 226 (1959).
81. Adam Lamparello, Note, Reaching Across Legal Boundaries: How
Mediation can Help the Criminal Law in Adjudicating "Crimes of Addiction," 16
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 335, 341-42 (2001). See generally Katherine Beckett &
Theodore Sassoon, Conservative Agendas and Campaigns, the Rise of the Modern
"Tough on Crime" Movement, in DEFENDING JUSTICE 43-68 (Palak Shah ed.,
Political Research Assocs. 2005), available at
http://www.publiceye.org/defendingjustice/pdfs/chapters/toughcrime.pdf (discussing
the "tough on crime" movement policies and their effect).
82. See, e.g., Judith Greene, Getting Tough on Crime: The History and
Political Context of Sentencing Reform Developments Leading to the Passage of the
1994 Crime Act, in
SENTENCING AND SOCIETY: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (Cyrus Tata & Neil
Hutton eds., Ashgate Publ'g Ltd. 2002), available at
http://www.justicestrategies.org/sites/default/files/Judy/GettingToughOnCrime.pdf
(providing a detailed discussion of the violent offender incarceration and truth in
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disorder" in the wake of the 1965 Los Angeles Riots led to the
replacement of rehabilitative theories of crime and punishment with
populist "tough on crime" initiatives. 83  This "tough on crime"
approach culminated in the devastating effect of George H. W. Bush's
now infamous "Willie Horton" advertising campaign during the 1988
presidential election, which almost single-handedly changed the
outcome of the presidential race. 84 Even today, political candidates
viewed as "soft on crime" are, in many places, considered
unelectable.85
As part of this return to punitive justice, legislatures across
America began enacting strict mandatory sentencing guidelines for a
large range of crimes. 86 Against this backdrop, the general consensus
was that the excessive use of clemency, a traditionally executive act,
had the potential to blur the separation of powers. Specifically, it was
felt that the exercise of clemency pitted this residual executive power
against the will of a democratically elected legislature, which had
enacted mandatory sentences.87  For the first time, the use of
clemency actively weakened the position of the executive.
At the state level, several governors found their exercise of
clemency being successfully used against them in subsequent election
campaigns.88 To this day, even within typically liberal-aligned states,
the use of clemency is considered a political minefield. For example,
although New York Governor Andrew Cuomo had been an outspoken
proponent of clemency prior to being elected, it took him over three
sentencing incentive grants, states' incorporation of victim advocacy initiatives, and
the "tough on crime" agenda).
83. Beckett & Sassoon, supra note 81.
84. DAVID C. ANDERSON, CRIME AND THE POLITICS OF HYSTERIA: HOW THE
WILLIE HORTON STORY CHANGED AMERICAN JUSTICE 5 (1995).
85. Beckett & Sassoon, supra note 81.
86. LISA M. SEGHETTI & ALISON M. SMITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL32766, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES: BACKGROUND, LEGAL ANALYSIS,
AND POLICY OPTIONS 12 (2007), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32766.pdf.
87. See Kobil, The Quality of Mercy, supra note 38, at 603 (discussing the
"dangerous trend" of executive overreach through the use of clemency).
88. See SARAT, supra note 31, at 66-68.
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years to grant his first and, to date, only pardon. 8 9 At the federal level,
the appearance of executive overreach into the courts and legislature
was even more damaging in light of the "small government" 90
framework emphasized by successive presidents since Nixon's "New
Federalism." 91 Raymond Theim, the Deputy Pardon Attorney to three
Republican presidents, including Reagan and George H. W. Bush,
summed up the feeling toward the use of clemency when he was in
office:
The feeling is that we should do as little as possible to grant
relief ... It's a dangerous trend for the executive to override the
function of the Courts and the parole system too much, both from
the point of view of the balance of power and of possible
corruption. ... Clemency is bestowed as an act of grace and not as
a matter of right. 92
89. The Editorial Bd., Editorial, Governor Cuomo's Stingy Pardons, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/04/opinion/governor-
cuomos-stingy-pardons.html.
90. Small government refers to the concept that the Government has only
those powers delegated to it by the people, and, thus, its interference should be
limited; this concept may be problematic for exercise of executive clemency. See
Kobil, The Quality of Mercy, supra note 38, at 603 ("The rarity of granting
clemency on grounds of innocence is due at least in part to a controversial
philosophy about clemency's proper role.").
91. Brent Cebul, Op-Ed., Government, Big or Small, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 23,
2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jan/23/opinion/la-oe-cebul-smaller-govt-
20120123. State officials are similarly reluctant to exercise clemency while
considering future campaigns for federal office. For example, in 1992, just months
before running against George H. W. Bush in the presidential race, Clinton refused
to grant clemency to a seriously brain-damaged death row inmate. See Killer
Executed After Clinton Denies Clemency, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 1992),
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/05/08/us/killer-executed-after-clinton-denies-
clemency.html. Many academics have suggested Bush's successful "Willie Horton
Campaign" played a significant role in Clinton's decision to deny clemency. See
James Acker & Charles Lanier, May God-or the Governor-Have Mercy: Executive
Clemency and Executions in Modern Death Penalty Systems, 36 CRIM. L. BULL.
200, 200-01 (2000), available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/Acker
Clemency.pdf (last visited May 20, 2014); see also Beckett & Sassoon, supra note
81 ("Clinton ... touted his record on capital punishment. (Perhaps to make the
point, Clinton returned to Arkansas in the midst of the 1992 campaign to oversee the
execution of a convicted killer with an IQ in the 70s.)").
92. Kobil, The Quality ofMercy, supra note 38, at 603.
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Evidencing the implementation of this view, restrictions on
clemency applications were employed during both the Reagan and
Bush Senior Administrations. For example, the Reagan
Administration tightened the rules surrounding applications for
clemency. 93 As a result of these restrictions, the number of clemency
applications fell dramatically during both of Reagan's terms in the
White House-a trend that has continued. 94 Moreover, grants of
clemency dropped from approximately eighteen percent under
President Nixon to just four percent under President George H. W.
Bush.95 Most recently, President Obama has been criticized for his
unwillingness to utilize the presidential pardon. 96
As such, although it was a trend towards merciful punishment that
originally transformed the clemency power from a political tool to a
familiar feature of the criminal justice system, this concept of mercy
has become the weakest point of the clemency power within the
modem justice framework. Considering this, it is unfortunate that the
USSC decided to thrust clemency into the heart of the criminal justice
system at a time when the exercise of clemency had become such a
politically unfavorable act.97
3. Clemency's Introduction to the Era ofInnocence
In the 1993 case of Herrera v. Collins, the USSC placed great
confidence in the clemency function by labeling it the "fail safe" of
the criminal justice system.98
Herrera had been convicted of capital murder and sentenced to
death in January 1982.99 The evidence against him included two
93. Charles S. Clark, Reagan Parsimonious in Use of Pardon Power, 42
CONG. Q. 2878, 2878 (1984).
94. See Clemency Statistics, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUST.,
http://www.justice.gov/pardon/statistics.htm (last updated Sept. 2014).
95. See id. (percentages calculated based on total number of petitions granted
as compared to the total number of petitions denied by the President or closed
without presidential action).
96. Arthur Delaney, Obama Presidential Pardons: The Elusiveness of
Executive Clemency, HUFFINGTON POST (June 3, 2011, 2:52 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/03/obama-presidential-pardons-n-870431.
html.
97. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
98. See id. at 415.
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eyewitnesses, circumstantial evidence, and a handwritten letter in
which Herrera impliedly admitted his guilt.' 00  In subsequent
proceedings, Herrera claimed his deceased brother had committed the
murders.01 Herrera's actual innocence claim was supported by:
affidavits from Herrera's cell-mate, school friend, and brother's
attorney, all of who claimed that Herrera's brother had confessed to
having committed the murders; 10 2 and an affidavit from Herrera's
nephew, who claimed to have witnessed his father carrying out the
murders. 1 03 Despite this evidence, the USSC held that Herrera's claim
of actual innocence (absent some other procedural violation in his
case) was not a ground for federal habeas relief.104 Rather, the Court
reasoned: (1) clemency was the "fail safe" of the criminal justice
system; 0 5 (2) state clemency processes are the proper mechanism for
assessing innocence claims;' 0 6 and (3) clemency had been the historic
remedy for preventing miscarriages of justice where the judicial
process had been exhausted. 107
Therefore, clemency is the final check on whether the entire legal
system has failed. This section, however, challenges the USSC's
account of clemency historically playing a key role in correcting
wrongful convictions. Rather, political expediency appears to be the
traditional, primary function of clemency. 08 Considering this, Part II
explores the extent to which current state clemency frameworks cater
to the "innocence role" afforded clemency.
99. Id. at 393.
100. Id. at 394.
101. See id. at 396.
102. Id. at 395-97.
103. Id. at 397.
104. Id. at 405.
105. Id. at 415.
106. See id. at 417 ("History shows that the traditional remedy for claims of
innocence based on new evidence .. .has been executive clemency.").
107. Id. at 412 n.13. Despite the USSC's decision in Herrera, the Texas
Board of Pardons and Paroles maintained it was beyond its function to review bare
innocence claims and rejected Herrera's clemency application. Nicholas Berg,
Note, Turning a Blind Eye to Innocence: The Legacy of Herrera v. Collins, 42 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 121, 145 (2005). Herrera was executed on May 12, 1993. Id. His
last words were: "I am innocent, innocent, innocent. . .. I am an innocent man, and
something very wrong is taking place tonight." Id. at 154.
108. See supra notes 21-39, 55-64 and accompanying text.
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II. A REVIEW OF STATE CLEMENCY FRAMEWORKS
The application of the clemency power differs from state to state.
Thirteen states give the Governor the sole power to preside over
clemency decisions.1 09 In five states, an administrative board solely
determines clemency decisions." 0 In other states, the Governor and
an administrative board share the clemency power.'" Most states
have established administrative boards that can make non-binding
clemency recommendations to the Governor. 112 In eight states, these
recommendations are mandatory procedure, and the Board must
provide the Governor with a recommendation before he or she can
act.' 13 This non-uniformity is largely due to a lack of "statutory or
administrative standards governing use of the power."1' 4 Thus, as one
commentator explains, "each governor has different ideas about the
function of executive clemency and ... the rate of granting clemency
varies dramatically . .. from state to state.""'1 5
In addition to highlighting the differences in the design of
clemency frameworks,116 a review of state clemency procedures
reveals a number of obstacles that may hinder innocents' abilities to
successfully navigate the clemency process. These obstacles fall into
three broad categories: (1) transparency issues; (2) imbalanced
administrative board compositions; and (3) barriers to meaningful
review. Although many of these issues apply to guilty inmates
seeking clemency, they are exacerbated in the cases of innocent
inmates attempting to utilize clemency to seek relief.
109. See Clemency, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/clemency (last visited May 20, 2014) [hereinafter
Clemency, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER].
110. Id.
111. Kobil, The Quality ofMercy, supra note 38, at 604-05.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 605.
115. Id. at 605-06.
116. Id.
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A. Transparency Issues
A review of state clemency frameworks reveals a number of
transparency issues unfavorable to innocents. These issues include a
lack of published reasoning for clemency decisions, selective
transparency, and expansive confidentiality rules. Each issue will be
considered in turn.
1. Lack ofPublished Reasoning
There is general lack of reasoning provided by executives and
administrative bodies determining clemency applications. For
example, Indiana and Nevada do not require the Governor to justify
any clemency decision by providing his or her rationale.117 Similarly,
in Idaho, the Commission of Pardons and Paroles publishes a list of
clemency decisions on its website, but does not embellish it with
detailed reasons.' 18  The same is true in Oklahoma," 9 Utah,120 and
Texas. 121 In New Jersey, the Governor must provide the state
legislature with a written report about the clemency applications he
117. See IND. CONST. art. V, § 17 (containing no explicit requirement that the
governor provide reasons for his or her decisions); NEV. CONST. art. V, § 13
(containing no explicit requirement that the governor provide reasons for his or her
decisions).
118. See Decisions, IDAHO COMMISSION OF PARDONS & PAROLE,
http://parole.idaho.gov/decisions.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) (publishing
decisions without supporting reasons).
119. See Dockets and Results, OKLA. PARDON & PAROLE BOARD,
http://www.ok.gov/ppb/DocketsandResults/index.html (last visited Nov. 16,
2014) (publishing pardon docket and results, which omit rationales behind
decisions).
120. See, e.g., Hearing Results of the Board of Pardons from Friday, Oct 10,
2014 to Monday, Nov 10, 2014, STATE OF UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLE,
http://bop.utah.gov/images/pdf/results.pdf (last visited Dec. 6, 2014) (results,
without justification, of the Board of Pardons and Paroles for the state of Utah).
121. See, e.g., Press Release, Gov. Perry Grants Clemency to Fourteen,
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR RICK PERRY (Dec. 21, 2012),
http://governor.state.tx.us/news/press-release/18001/. The case of Cameron Todd
Willingham highlights the troubling nature of this Texas provision in the innocence
context. See generally Grann, supra note 13 (discussing the Texas Board of Pardons
and Paroles's denial of Willingham's clemency petition without explanation or
record of deliberations).
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grants, but there is no equivalent requirement for those he denies.' 22
The procedure is the same in New York 23 and Oregon.124
Notwithstanding this requirement, reports from the Oregon Governor
include only a minimal offering of reasons for his grants of
clemency. 125 The procedures in Utah facially appear to provide for
greater transparency because state rules dictate that the Board of
Pardons and Paroles' decisions-made following public hearings-be
public documents; the Board "may publish its decisions on its website
or other forum or in other forms, at its discretion and convenience."' 26
These decisions and any accompanying reasons are not substantive,
however, and the appearance of transparency fades in application.12 7
In states where the clemency power is shared between an
administrative board and the Governor, the executive can ignore board
recommendations; this is the case even in states that require
administrative boards to provide the reasons behind clemency
decisions or that make clemency decisions public documents. In
Washington, for example, hearings before the Clemency and Pardons
Board are public-as are the deliberations of the Board members. 128
As part of this process, each Board member must vote and explain the
rationale behind his or her decision.129 However, as is the case with
122. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:167-3.1 (West, Westlaw through L.2014, c. 75 and
J.R. No. 3).
123. N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 4 ("The governor shall annually communicate to
the legislature each case of reprieve, commutation or pardon granted.").
124. OR. CONST. art. V, § 14 ("He shall have power to remit fines, and
forfeitures, under such regulations as may be prescribed by law; and shall report to
the Legislative Assembly at its next meeting each case of reprieve, commutation, or
pardon granted, and the reasons for granting the same.").
125. See, e.g., Theodore R. Kulongoski, Clemency Report to Legislature, OR.
STATE LIBRARY (Jan. 10, 2011), http://library.state.or.us/repository/2011/
201102251522015/201 1.pdf.
126. UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 671-305 (West, Westlaw through Nov. 1, 2014).
127. For example, clemency decisions and accompanying reasons do not
appear on the hearing results website for the State of Utah Board of Pardons and
Parole. See Hearings Results, STATE OF UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLE,
http://bop.utah.gov/hearings-top-public-menu.html (follow "Hearings" dropdown
menu; then follow "Results" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 7, 2014).
128. See Washington State Clemency & Pardons Board Policies, STATE OF
WASH. OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR 4-5 (Dec. 7, 2012),
http://www.govemor.wa.gov/office/clemency/documents/policies.pdf.
129. Id.
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most administrative board recommendations, rationales provided may
be ignored by the Washington Governor.130  Arizona has a similar
facility for its Board of Executive Clemency. Although the Board
does not necessarily have to provide extensive reasons in its public
hearings, it may provide a lengthy letter of recommendation to the
Governor.131 Again, however, the Board's recommendations are not
binding. 132 Notably, there are numerous states, including Arizona,
Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and
Texas, that employ a system whereby the board must give a
recommendation before the Governor can act-regardless of whether
he or she acts in accordance with the recommendation.' 33 To date,
however, it appears that no state has established binding
administrative board recommendations.134
2. Selective Transparency
As evidenced above, where there is transparency, it is sometimes
selective and unfavorable to applicants. Similar to clemency
procedures in New Jersey, New York, and Oregon, which only
provide some level of transparency to clemency grants (but not to
130. Id. ("After the Board has reached a decision, the Chairperson announces
it and closes the Board's record on the Petition. The recommendation is submitted
to the Governor who is not bound to follow the Board's recommendation or take any
action on the Petition.").
131. See, e.g., Letter from Arizona Board of Executive Clemency to the
Honorable Janice K. Brewer, Governor of the State of Arizona (Aug. 25, 2009) (on
file with author) (Arizona Board of Executive Clemency's letter of recommendation
for a commutation of sentence for William Macumber).
132. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-402(A) (2001) (West) ("[T]he board of
executive clemency shall have exclusive power to pass upon and recommend
reprieves, commutations, paroles and pardons. No reprieve, commutation or pardon
may be granted by the governor unless it has first been recommended by the
board.").
133. See Clemency, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, supra note 109.
134. But see Joseph N. Rupcich, Comment, Abusing a Limitless Power:
Executive Clemency in Illinois, 28 S. ILL. U. L.J. 131, 151 (2003) ("Alternatively,
some states have given a board or advisory group power to make a binding
recommendation to the governor for his exercise of clemency.").
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clemency denials), Louisiana and South Carolina also apply selective
transparency rules unfavorable to clemency applicants. 35
In Louisiana, all letters submitted in favor of a clemency applicant
are subject to public inspection, whereas letters from victims and
victims' representatives are not.13 6 In effect, an innocent inmate in
Louisiana is unable to challenge the rationale advanced in the letter of
an alleged victim opposing his or her clemency application. Letters
and statements in support of, or in opposition to, clemency may vary,
but they can be significant. Generally, an inmate's family and friends
may write to demonstrate that the inmate has a support network
outside of prison; counselors may submit a letter to provide details
about an inmate's temperament or work and education programs the
inmate has completed while in prison. Victims may make statements
about the long-term impacts of the crime for which the applicant was
convicted. Sentencing judges may also write because they feel the
mandatory sentence they were legally bound to impose was too harsh
and deserves correction. In the context of innocence claims, jurors at
the clemency applicant's trial may write to say that, in light of new
evidence, they would not vote for a guilty verdict; eyewitnesses or
"snitches" may recant their trial testimony; and experts may submit
statements to support clemency applications. As such, Louisiana's
selective procedures may disadvantage an innocent inmate by
preventing him or her from challenging-or, at least, fully
challenging-arguments presented against his or her clemency
application. By contrast, the State will be advantaged by full access to
all materials in support of and in opposition to the inmate's
application.
In South Carolina, the Board of Pardons and Paroles, which
makes decisions in non-capital cases, is mandated to publish
accountability reports; however, these reports are merely business or
core values reports,' 37 which add very little to the substantive
transparency of decision-making in the state clemency process. As
135. See LA. CONST. art. IV, § 5(E)(1); S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-21-920 (West,
Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.).
136. LA REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:573.1(B), (E) (West, Westlaw through 2014
Reg. Sess.).
137. See Facts and Figures, S.C. DEPARTMENT OF PROBATION, PAROLE &
PARDON SERVICES, http://www.dppps.sc.gov/Facts&Figures.html (last visited Sept.
26, 2014).
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aforementioned, other states, such as Idaho,' 38 Oklahoma,13 9 Utah,140
and Texas,141 provide statistics or other brief information about
clemency decisions, but, again, nothing substantive. Although these
examples give the appearance of transparency, they are, in reality,
quite shallow when it comes to shedding light on the rationale behind
clemency decisions.
3. Lack ofRecords and Expansive Confidentiality Rules
A general lack of record-keeping and the expansive
confidentiality rules governing clemency proceedings also result in a
lack of transparency. For example: New Mexico has no particular
record keeping processes in place; 14 2 the Mississippi Constitution does
not expressly require that records on decision-making processes be
kept;143 in Vermont, the Parole Board holds public hearings, but board
member deliberations are not recorded;14 4 and in Ohio, Clemency
Reports-which cover the particulars of an applicant's case, but are
only sometimes completed by Parole Board Parole Officers-are
confidential.145 Texas also has an expansive confidentiality regime,
where six categories of information are considered confidential in the
event an inmate seeks clemency: Department of Public Safety records;
138. See IDAHO CONST. art. IV, § 7.
139. See OKLA. CONST. art. VI, § 10.
140. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-27-9(1)(a), (c) (West, Westlaw through 2014
Gen. Sess.).
141. See Annual Statistical Report Fiscal Year 2013, TEX. BOARD OF
PARDONS & PAROLES 26, http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/bpp/publications/BPP%20
StatisticalReport%20FY%202014.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) (Executive
Clemency section includes statistics without justifications); Texas Board of Pardons
and Paroles Publications Page, TEX. BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLES,
http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/bpp/publications/publications.html (last updated Sept. 4,
2014) (Board publications limited to annual statistical reports).
142. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-21-17 (West, Westlaw through 2nd Reg. Sess.
Of the 51st Legislature (2014), effective May 21, 2014).
143. MIsS. CONST. art. V, § 124.
144. See The Vermont Parole Board Manual, VT. DEPARTMENT OF CORR.,
http://doc.vermont.gov/about/parole-board/the-vermont-parole-board-manual-
revised-january-17-2014-1, at 19, 36, (last revised Jan. 17, 2014).
145. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2967.07 (West, Westlaw through Files 1 to 144
and Statewide Issue 1 of the 120th GA (2013-2014)).
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criminal history information; execution summaries and prison records;
recommendations from trial officials; letters from victims and
supporters; letters from inmate and supporters; and general
correspondence from the public. 146
The rationale for confidentiality is legitimate: to protect the
privacy of applicants and victims and to encourage "frank and open
decision-making" by shielding the deliberative processes of decision-
makers from overbearing scrutiny.14 7 However, confidentiality rules
may avert public scrutiny of exculpatory issues and thereby prevent
innocents from being identified or hinder their ability to challenge the
case against them. For example, in 2010, a journalist in Texas wanted
to examine documents related to the clemency application of death-
row inmate Hank Skinner after it came to light that there was DNA
evidence in his case that, if tested, could possibly exonerate him.148
The Texas Board of Pardons and Parole rejected the journalist's
request for "correspondence, documents and reports" related to the
Skinner case because nearly all such information was deemed to be
confidential. 149
Transparency is an important factor in clemency proceedings
because it interlinks with a bundle of other important, justice-related
concepts. According to Leona D. Jochnowitz:
[T]he question of public access to state ... clemency petitions is
emblematic of important issues regarding the fairness, standards,
effectiveness, flexibility and diversity of the various clemency
146. See Brandi Grissom, Pardons Documents Kept Secret, TEX. TRIBUNE
(Feb. 9, 2010), http://www.texastribune.org/2010/02/09/pardons-documents-kept-
secret/.
147. Leona D. Jochnowitz, Public Access to State Clemency Petitions, 44 No.
2 CRIM. L. BULL. 2, 2 (Mar.-Apr. 2008); see also, e.g., Grissom, supra note 146 (a
2001 open records ruling issued by then-Attorney General John Comyn noted "the
confidentiality protects not only the prisoner's privacy but also 'the deliberations of
the board by encouraging frank and open discussion in its decision-making
process"').
148. See Grissom, supra note 146.
149. Id. In 2012, the prosecutor agreed to the requested DNA testing. See Eli
Okun, Ruling Goes Against Death Row Inmate Skinner, TEX. TRIBUNE (July 15,
2014), http://www.texastribune.org/2014/07/16/judge-rules-dna-evidence-doesnt-
exonerate-skinner/. In 2014, however, a judge determined that the newly tested
DNA evidence would not have changed the jury's decision in Skinner's case. See
id.
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procedures. It also is related to the question of who controls,
monitors and historically preserves the records depicting the
unbridled discretion associated with the clemency process.150
Additionally, transparency can reveal injustice. This is why Kathleen
Dean Moore argues that clemency decisions should be made on a
"basis of reason," which is then made public.1"' Moore asserts that
public scrutiny allows for an assessment of whether a clemency
decision is "principled, reasonable and fair."' 52 "Sunshine is thus an
antiseptic."153
Veiled decision-making, selective transparency, and expansive
confidentiality regimes expose the clemency process to potential
abuse. As previously noted, many states shield clemency decisions
and, more importantly, the reasoning underpinning those decisions
from the full light of day. A number of states-such as Arizona, 154
Maryland, 155 Utah,156 Nebraska,' 57 and Washington '58-- do, however,
conduct clemency hearings in a public setting, providing significant
transparency for credible innocence claims to be aired and
identified. 19
Finally, the rationale behind confidentiality rules can conflict with
"transparency needs," especially with regard to protecting
recommendations to deny clemency and victim statements.' 6 0 As a
result of these transparency issues, it is possible that the rejection of
clemency applications based on credible innocence claims may never
150. Id.
151. Kathleen Dean Moore, Symposium, Pardon for Good and Sufficient
Reasons, 27 U. RICH. L. REv. 281, 281 (1993).
152. Id.
153. Jochnowitz, supra note 147.
154. ARI. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-402 A-D (2014) (West).
155. MD. CONST. art. II, § 20.
156. UTAH CODE ANN., § 77-27-9(1)(a), (c) (West, Westlaw through 2014
Gen. Sess.).
157. NEB. REv. STAT. § 83-1,126 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.).
158. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 11.
159. The meaningfulness of these hearings is discussed infra Part II.C.
160. Id.
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be identified, let alone corrected, and clemency is therefore hindered
in its role as a "tool of corrective justice."'61
B. Imbalanced Administrative Board Compositions
Administrative boards play a significant role in the vast majority
of state clemency proceedings; therefore, the composition of these
boards is crucial to the assessment of innocence claims.
In order to encourage balanced, collaborative dialogues about how
the risk of wrongful convictions can be reduced, American innocence
commissions have brought together representatives from across the
criminal justice system, including prosecutors, defense attorneys,
victims' rights advocates, politicians, scientists, and academics. 1 62
This collaboration brings "usually autonomous actors ... together to
encourage change."' 63 Rachel Barkow argues that such diversity is
equally important when it comes to administrative boards involved in
clemency processes, because diverse administrative boards can add
expediency, political cover, and legitimacy to a grant of clemency. 164
Barkow asserts that clemency boards should "not be mere arms of law
enforcement interests, for that could skew them . .. against issuing
any grants at all."1 65 Instead, clemency boards should be "careful to
mix law enforcement interests with those of defense lawyers and
former offenders so that each side can learn from the other and
increase the likelihood that sound conclusions will be reached and less
subject to political attack." 66 In the context of innocence, a diverse
161. Brian M. Hoffstadt, Normalizing the Federal Clemency Power, 79 TEX.
L. REV. 561, 572. However, Hoffstadt notes that increased transparency implicates
public policy. Id. at 596-609 ("In addition to the constitutional questions, the public
policy ramifications of making the executive clemency process more 'transparent'-
that is, open to the public, subject to mandatory procedures, and governed by fixed,
substantive standards-must be examined.").
162. Sarah Lucy Cooper, Innocence Commissions in America: Ten Years
After, in CONTROVERSIES IN INNOCENCE CASES IN AMERICA 198, 201 (Sarah Lucy
Cooper ed., 2014).
163. Id. at 215.
164. See Rachel E. Barkow, The Politics of Forgiveness: Reconceptualizing
Clemency, 21 FED. SENT. REP. 153, 155-56 (2009), available at
http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/ECMPRO_062016.pdf.
165. Id. at 156.
166. Id.
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board may also mean that innocence claims will glean a more
balanced review.
Administrative boards in some states do reflect a degree of
diversity. For example, the Kentucky Board brings together members
from legal, investigative, teaching, medicine, corrections, and social
work backgrounds.1 67 Ohio's Board is comprised of members with
varying experience in victims' rights, rehabilitation and corrections,
and law.1 68  The Pennsylvania Board integrates members with
experience in offender mentoring, specialized courts, corrections, law
enforcement, parole, medical technology, science, and law, including
criminal defense.1 69 South Carolina's Board includes individuals with
backgrounds in religious practice, administration, parole, probation,
social work, nursing, pharmaceuticals, management, realty,
automotive brokering, personal training, teaching, and military
service.1 7 0 The Board in South Carolina is, however, nearly devoid of
members aligned with the criminal defense community and, instead,
consists mostly of individuals aligned with state prosecutorial services
or organizations.17 '
Other administrative boards are more overtly state aligned. For
instance, the Nebraska Board of Pardons is comprised of the
Governor, the Secretary of State, and the Attorney General.172
Colorado requires that its Board include the Executive Director of the
Department of Corrections, the Executive Director of the Department
of Public Safety, and at least one person who is a crime victim (or
suitable representative) in its membership; 7 3 there is no requirement
167. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 439.320(1) (West, Westlaw through 2014
legislation).
168. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5149.10 (West, Westlaw through Files I to 140
and Statewide Issue of the 120th GA (20132014)).
169. PENN. CONST. art. IV, § 9(b).
170. S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-21-10(b) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.);
About PPP, STATE OF S.C. DEPARTMENT OF PROBATION, PAROLE & PARDON
SERVICES, http://www.dppps.sc.gov/stateboard.html (last visited May 3, 2014)
[hereinafter STATE OF S.C. DEPARTMENT OF PROBATION, PAROLE & PARDON
SERVICES].
171. See STATE OF S.C. DEPARTMENT OF PROBATION, PAROLE & PARDON
SERVICES, supra note 170.
172. NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1,126 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.).
173. Ga. Exec. Order No. B 2012 003 (Oct. 19, 2012),
http://www.colorado.gov [hereinafter Ga. Exec. Order No. B 2012 003] (search
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that the Board include any defense-orientated members.' 7 4 In Nevada,
the Board of Pardons is comprised of the Governor, the Attorney
General, and the seven Nevada State Supreme Court Justices,' 75 the
majority of whom have backgrounds in complex civil law; in fact,
only three of the Justices have any experience in criminal law,' 76 and,
of those, only one has a background, albeit a minimal one, in criminal
defense-having spent one year working with the Public Defender's
Office.' 77 The Utah Board of Pardons and Parole has eight members,
of whom seven have backgrounds in state organizations, including:
the District Attorney's Office, the Department of Corrections, the
Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel, Homeland
Defense and Security, and the Attorney General's Office.178
The inclusion of board members from state aligned organizations,
however, is not wholly unfavorable. As Barkow states, it is important
to "include groups most likely to oppose such [clemency] grants"1 79
because involving such representatives "is a critical means of muting
any subsequent criticism" 80 of a decision to grant clemency. The
issue, then, is the extent to which state aligned representatives eclipse
those from the criminal defense and inmate communities.
Unfortunately, a survey of recent state clemency boards reveals a
distinct lack of diversity in board composition. Clemency boards
"clemency;" then follow "Clemency Advisory Board, Executive" hyperlink); see
also Ga. Exec. Order No. B 008 07 (Aug. 2007), http://www.colorado.gov
[hereinafter Ga. Exec. Order No. B 008 07] (search "clemency;" then follow "b 008
07 executive order the executive clemency advisory board" hyperlink).
174. See Ga. Exec. Order No. B 2012 003, supra note 173; Ga. Exec Order
No. B 008 07, supra note 173.
175. NEV. CONST. art. V, § 13.
176. See The Supreme Court of Nevada Justices, SUPREME CRT. OF NEV.,
http://supreme.nvcourts.gov/Supreme/CourtInformation/TheSupremeCourtof
NevadaJustices/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2014). The three justices with experience in
criminal law are Justice Michael A. Cherry, Justice Nancy M. Saitta and Justice Ron
D. Parraguirre. Id. (follow "Justice Michael A. Cherry," "Justice Nancy M. Saitta,"
and "Justice Ron D. Parraguirre" hyperlinks).
177. See id. (follow "Justice Michael A. Cherry" hyperlink).
178. Board Members, STATE OF UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLES,
http://www.bop.utah.gov/board-top-public-menu/members.html (last visited April
26, 2014).
179. Barkow, supra note 164, at 155.
180. Id.
30
California Western Law Review, Vol. 51 [2014], No. 1, Art. 5
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol51/iss1/5
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAw REVIEW
devoid of representation by individuals (such as lawyers, academics,
and scientists) with a working knowledge of post-conviction review,
state evidence and innocence rules, and the causes of wrongful
convictions are problematic for a balanced assessment of innocence
claims.
C. Barriers to Meaningful Review
As clemency has been saddled with the responsibility of serving
as the final adjudicator of innocence claims, one scholar argues "[t]o
serve properly ... as a safeguard, it is essential that the clemency
power be checked, so as to require, at the very least, that all
applications for clemency are meaningfully reviewed."' 8 ' There are
numerous potential barriers to the meaningful review of clemency
applications, particularly for innocents, including: (1) high thresholds
for eligibility and relief and antipathetic attitudes; (2) obstacles to the
evaluation of claims; and (3) a lack of specific innocence procedures.
1. High Thresholds and Antipathetic State Attitudes
Toward Granting Clemency
High thresholds operate to restrict or foreclose the opportunities
for an inmate's clemency application to be heard. State clemency
frameworks generally employ two particularly high thresholds:
eligibility requirements and requirements for relief. Additionally,
evidence indicates that decision-makers are generally hostile toward
granting clemency. This subsection considers these thresholds and
attitudes.
a. Eligibility Thresholds
Numerous states employ high eligibility thresholds for clemency.
Some states, for example, require a payment to access the clemency
system. In Pennsylvania, an inmate must pay $8 for a clemency
181. Alyson Dinsmore, Clemency in Capital Cases: The Need to Ensure
Meaningful Review, 49 UCLA L. REv. 1825, 1857 (2002).
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application form.182  Other states employ a more typical, robust
eligibility threshold. Among them, Indiana requires inmates to serve a
third of their sentence before applying for clemency;' 83 Connecticut
requires inmates to serve four years if their original sentence exceeds
eight years and half of the original sentence if the original sentence is
less than eight years;1 84 and Colorado requires inmates to serve one
third or ten years of their sentence, whichever is less.' 85 In Georgia,
state law does not dictate a minimum number of years be served
before applying for clemency; rather, there is a general requirement
that an inmate serve at least one-third of his or her sentence.1 86
Requirements like these are patently problematic for innocents
because they eliminate a mechanism for relief for substantial amounts
of time, often without special consideration of credible innocence
claims.
Other states employ strict disqualification criteria. In Indiana, for
example, any inmate whose institutional record reflects one major
violation or two or more minor violations in the last year is precluded
from applying for clemency.' 87 Comparably, Virginia requires that an
applicant not have pleaded guilty to be eligible to apply for
clemency; '88 this prerequisite is particularly troublesome given that
182. How to Obtain an Application for Clemency, PA BOARD OF PARDONS,
http://www.bop.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/how-to-request-an-applicati
on/14411 (last visited Oct. 10, 2014).
183. Petition for Clemency, IN.Gov,
http://www.in.gov/idoc/files/petition-forclemency-form.pdf (last visited Oct 1,
2014).
184. Information and Instructions for New Clemency Form, CONN. BOARD OF
PARDONS & PAROLES (Feb. 24, 2014, 2:34:57 PM),
http://www.ct.gov/bopp/cwp/view.asp?A=433 1&Q=508208 [hereinafter CONN.
BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLES].
185. See, e.g., Colorado, CRIM. JUSTICE FOUND. (June 30, 2014),
http://www.cjpf.org/clemency-co.
186. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, STATE BOARD OF PARDONS &
PAROLES, http://pap.georgia.gov/frequently-asked-questions-0 (last visited May 26,
2014).
187. 220 IND. ADMIN. CODE 1.1-4-1(i) (West, Westlaw through amendments
received through the Ind. Weekly Collection, dated Dec. 3, 2014).
188. See Absolute Pardons and Writ of Actual Innocence, VIRGINIA.GOV,
https://commonwealth.virginia.gov/judicial-system/pardons/absolute-pardons/ (last
visited Oct. 10, 2014) [hereinafter VA., Absolute Pardons].
32
California Western Law Review, Vol. 51 [2014], No. 1, Art. 5
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol51/iss1/5
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
research shows numerous DNA exonerees originally pleaded guilty to
a crime they did not commit. 189
b. Relief Thresholds
Some states employ high thresholds for clemency relief.
Applicants in Connecticut, for example, must "describe and submit
evidence of specific extraordinary circumstances or specific
exemplary conduct supporting the request for clemency;"1 90 however,
what constitutes "extraordinary circumstances" is not defined. In
Wisconsin, applicants must show that the need for clemency is
"significant and documented."'91 Washington also requires
"extraordinary circumstances" to grant clemency. 192 The list of
factors considered by the Washington Board when determining if an
application is sufficiently "extraordinary" to warrant relief does not
expressly include innocence or dubious guilt.19 3 In contrast, the
factors considered by the Board of Pardons in South Dakota do
expressly include (1) substantial evidence indicating one's sentence
was a miscarriage of justice and (2) proven innocence by clear and
convincing evidence.' 9 4 The Montana Board of Pardons and Paroles
also considers whether an inmate petitioning for clemency can
189. For an analysis of the frequency of guilty pleas, see Rebecca Stephens,
Disparities in Postconviction Remedies for Those who Plead Guilty and Those
Convicted at Trial: A Survey of State Statutes and Recommendations for Reform,
103(1) J. OF CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 309 (2013), available at
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestem.edu/jclc/voll03/issl/7/.
190. CONN. BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLES, supra note 184.
191. Application for Executive Clemency, STATE OF WIS. OFFICE OF THE
GOVERNOR Part 111.6, http://www.recordgone.com/public/templates/default/
pdf/Wisconsin-Pardon-Application.pdf (last visited May 23, 2014) [hereafter Wis.,
Application].
192. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.885 (West, Westlaw through 2014
Legislation and Initiative Measures 594 (2015 c 1) and 1351 (2015 c 2); see also
Washington State Clemency & Pardons Board Policies, STATE OF WASH. OFFICE OF
THE GOVERNOR Part II.B (Dec. 7, 2012), http://www.governor.wa.gov/
office/clemency/documents/policies.pdf [hereinafter Wash. Pardons Board
Policies].
193. See Wash. Pardons Board Policies, supra note 192, at Part II.B.
194. S.D. ADMIN R. 17:60:05:12 (West, Westlaw through rule published in
S.D. register dated Nov. 24, 2014).
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"satisfactorily prove innocence of a crime" for which he or she is
serving or has served a sentence. 195
High relief thresholds are a hallmark of the American post-
conviction relief arena.196  This is likely because employing high
relief thresholds is a means of ensuring finality, which is one of the
American criminal justice system's greatest obsessions.' 97 Given the
clemency system's relationship with the criminal justice system, it is
unsurprising to find the application of rules that largely preserve trial
verdicts, thus supporting the system's general allegiance to finality.
Accordingly, clemency boards and executives avoid unraveling jury
verdicts,' 98 despite their responsibility to do so when a case warrants
such action, i.e., in cases involving credible innocence claims. 199
c. Antipathetic State Attitudes
As well as employing high eligibility and relief thresholds,
numerous states underscore that a grant of clemency, especially one
grounded in innocence, is rare. Moreover, some states give the
impression they are unwelcoming of such applications. For example,
the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles states in its annual report
that a grant of clemency based on "complete innocence" is "most
rare," 200 and highlights that only two such pardons have been granted
since 1943.201 In Virginia, it is emphasized that an "absolute pardon,"
which is a pardon based on the belief that a petitioner is innocent and
195. MONT. ADMIN. R. 20.25.901A(5) (West, Westlaw through Issue 12 of the
2014 Mont. Admin. Register, dated June 30, 2014).
196. See generally Kathleen Callahan, In Limbo: In re Davis and the Future of
Herrera Innocence Claims in Federal Habeas Proceedings, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 629
(2011) (discussing practical concerns that "make it difficult, if not practically
impossible, for wrongfully convicted prisoners to obtain" clemency).
197. See id. at 655.
198. See, e.g., Ridolfi & Gordon, supra note 4, at 1 (providing the example of
former California Governor Pete Wilson, in the case of Brenda Aris, who stated that
he "[was] not in a position to retry criminal cases or to speculate as to what might
have been if different evidence were before the jury").
199. See discussion infra Part III.
200. Annual Report 2006, GA. STATE BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLES 31,
http://pap.georgia.gov/sites/pap.georgia.gov/files/Annual Reports/06AnnualReport
.pdf (last visited May 16, 2014).
201. Id.
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was unjustly convicted, is "rarely granted." 202  The general
information section of Wisconsin's application for clemency advises
that "[e]xecutive clemency is an extraordinary measure and is rarely
granted."203 The point is bolded and underlined.204
Collectively, these thresholds and projected antipathetic attitudes
are unfavorable to innocent inmates because they tightly restrict the
timeframe in which an inmate can apply for clemency, set a high bar
for relief, and discourage inmates from applying. Requiring an
innocent inmate to serve a third of his or her sentence before applying
for clemency, for example, hardly comports with notions of justice.
Additionally, many innocent inmates lack the "clear and convincing"
evidence of innocence or "extraordinary circumstances" required for
relief. One way to satisfy this "clear and convincing" standard is by
presenting DNA evidence; however, only between 5% and 10% of
criminal cases involve DNA evidence, 205 and, even when such
evidence exists, inmates often face issues gaining access to and testing
it.206 Innocence cases often confront a hodgepodge of other problems,
such as false confessions, erroneous eyewitness identifications,
jailhouse snitches, State misconduct, ineffective lawyering, and
unreliable forensic evidence. 207 Such obstacles are exacerbated by
clemency procedures and attitudes unfavorable to innocent inmates.
2. Obstacles to the Evaluation of Claims
There are numerous junctures of the review process of clemency
applications that are potentially unfavorable to innocents. First, many
states' clemency application forms are designed without a focus on
innocence, failing to include specific questions about innocence or the
202. VA., Absolute Pardons, supra note 188.
203. WIs., Application, supra note 191, at Part 1.3 (emphasis omitted).
204. Id.
205. Non-DNA Exonerations, INNOCENCE PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/non-dna-exonerations.php (last visited Oct.
10, 2014) [hereinafter INNOCENCE PROJECT, Non-DNA Exonerations].
206. Access to DNA Testing, INNOCENCE PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/fix/DNA-Testing-Access.php (last visited Oct. 10,
2014).
207. The Causes of Wrongful Conviction, INNOCENCE PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2014).
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potential causes of a wrongful conviction. 2 08 This is not true in all
states, however. Some states' applications include a space where
applicants can provide their version of events. For example, the
Illinois application asks applicants to "provide [their] own version of
the factual circumstances of the offense(s)."2 09 Additionally, some
states, like Illinois and Arizona, allow applicants to file supplementary
documentation to support their applications.2 10
Second, the investigation of claims raised in clemency
applications can be troublesome. Some states, including Oklahoma
and Nebraska, indicate that clemency claims are investigated without
clarifying the form or the extent of the investigations. 2 1  Missouri
provides slightly more information, stating that the Board may
investigate information ranging from criminal history and medical
needs to statements from relevant lawyers, judges, and victims. 212
The issue of investigation of claims links with the transparency
concerns identified above; a lack of information regarding the depth to
208. For example, South Dakota and Arkansas utilize clemency applications
that do not ask about innocence. See Application for Executive Clemency, S.D.
BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLES, http://doc.sd.gov/documents/forms/clemency/
E2100VI-ExecutivePardonApplicationJan20l3.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2014);
Arkansas Pardon Application Instructions, ARK. PAROLE BOARD,
http://paroleboard.arkansas.gov/Clemency/Documents/Applications/PardonApplicati
on070214.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2014).
209. See Executive Clemency Relief, STATE OF ILL.,
https://www2.illinois.gov/prb/documents/sample%20petition%204.13.14.pdf (last
visited Oct. 10, 2014) [hereafter ILL., Executive Clemency]. Michigan also provides
applicants with an opportunity to describe the event. See Application for Pardon or
Commutation, STATE OF MICH. DEPARTMENT OF CORR.,
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/corrections/application-for-pardonorcomm
utation_-_current-prisoner 3310147.pdf (last revised July 2011).
210. ILL., Executive Clemency, supra note 209; Pardon Application, ARIZ.
BOARD OF EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY, https://boec.az.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
files/Completed%20Pardon%20Application%20fillable_0.pdf (last revised Oct. 29,
2013).
211. See Pardon Process, OKLA. PARDON & PAROLE BOARD,
http://www.ok.gov/ppb/Pardon Process/PardonProcess/index.html (last visited
Oct. 10, 2014); see also Pardon Application Guidelines, STATE OF NEB. BOARD OF
PARDONS § 003.02, http://www.pardons.state.ne.us/app--guidelines.html [hereinafter
NEB., Pardon Application Guidelines] (last revised July 1, 1994).
212. Executive Clemency, Mo. DEPARTMENT OF CORR.,
http://doc.mo.gov/PP/ExecutiveClemency.php (last visited May 30, 2014).
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which clemency applications and innocence claims are investigated
may allow abuse of process.213
Third, although numerous states offer hearings to expand upon the
claims set out in clemency applications, sometimes this mechanism is
underutilized or is inadequate to facilitate innocence claims. In
Washington and Nebraska, hearings are only provided after a
preliminary decision is made that the application has merit;2 14
however, the meaning of "merit" is unclear. Even if a hearing is
granted in Nebraska, "[i]t is not .. . the purpose of the hearing to retry
the case or determine guilt or innocence." 215  Similarly, in
Washington, "the hearing is not a forum to retry the conviction." 216 in
Ohio, hearings are discretionary. 2 17 Pennsylvania218 and Utah219 have
typical hearing time requirements of fifteen and twenty minutes,
respectively. By contrast, other states, like Georgia 22 0 and Arizona, 22 1
permit hearings to span many hours.
213. For example, such a lack of information may result in a failure (or poor
attempt) to investigate or other misconduct, which may go undiscovered due to the
lack of transparency. Accordingly, an inmate could be severely disadvantaged, yet
never know of such faulty investigation or misconduct in the handling of his or her
application.
214. Wash. Pardons Board Policies, supra note 192, at Part III.A; NEB.,
Pardon Application Guidelines, supra note 211, at § 003.01.
215. See State Clemency Policy for the State of Nevada, CRIM. JUSTICE
POLICY FOUND., http://www.cjpf.org/clemency-ne (last updated June 23, 2014).
216. Wash. Pardons Board Policies, supra note 192, at Part III.A.
217. Clemency Procedures: Non-Death Penalty Cases, STATE OF OHIO
DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION & CORR. (June 6, 2014),
http://www.drc.ohio.gov/web/drc-policies/documents/105-PBD-05.pdf.
218. Clemency Process, PA. BOARD OF PARDONS,
http://www.bop.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/process/19509 (last visited
May 18, 2014) ("No more than 15 minutes is allowed for each applicant's
presentation.").
219. State Clemency Policy for the State of Utah, CRIM. JUSTICE POLICY
FOUND., http://www.cjpf.org/clemency-ut (last updated July 30, 2014).
220. For example, the hearing for Troy Anthony Davies, prior to his
execution, lasted one day. Rhonda Cook & Bill Rankin, Parole Board Denies
Clemency for Troy Davis, AJC.COM (Sept. 20, 2011),
http://www.ajc.com/news/news/local/parole-board-denies-clemency-for-troy-
davis/nQLyy/#_federated= 1.
221. For example, Bill Macumber's two clemency hearings lasted numerous
hours. See BARRY SIEGEL, MANIFEST INJUSTICE: THE TRUE STORY OF A CONVICTED
MURDERER AND THE LAWYERS WHO FOUGHT FOR HIS FREEDOM ch. 19, 25 (2014).
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During the clemency application review process, applicants are
faced with obstacles potentially unfavorable to innocents. These
obstacles, such as restricted clemency application forms, undefined
investigations, and limited hearings, reduce the likelihood that
innocence claims will be effectively examined and evaluated by
administrative boards and executives.
3. Lack of Specific Innocence Procedures
As noted, clemency was not originally developed to assess
innocence claims; 22 2 rather, an innocence role was thrust upon it by
the USSC in Herrera. This sub-section considers the extent to which
states have remodeled (or, indeed, failed to remodel) their clemency
frameworks to account for its innocence role.
a. Innocence and Extraordinary Circumstances Procedures
Numerous states employ special clemency procedures for
extraordinary circumstances, which aim to streamline the application
process. However, such procedures often fail to cater to innocence
claims by routinely omitting actual innocence from the list of
extraordinary circumstances considered. In West Virginia, for
example, "an inmate, parolee, or probationer must have contributed
extraordinary service to his penal institution, exhibited extraordinary
motivation toward his rehabilitation, or. . . suffer[ed] an extreme[,]
life-threatening medical condition that has been certified by prison
medical staff in order to be eligible to apply for a pardon." 223
Arizona's special procedures only cover applicants in "imminent
danger of death," in a permanent vegetative state, or pending
execution.224 The Utah Board of Pardons may, in exceptional
circumstances, adjust its prior decisions through a special-attention
review or hearing; 225 in Utah, exceptional circumstances include
illness requiring extensive medical attention, exceptional performance
222. See discussion supra Part I.
223. Executive Clemency Guidelines, W. VA. PAROLE BOARD,
http://www.paroleboard.wv.gov/executiveclemency/Pages/guidelines.aspx (last
visited May 18, 2014).
224. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31-403(D)(1) (2001) (West).
225. UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 671-311 (West, Westlaw through Aug. 1, 2014).
38
California Western Law Review, Vol. 51 [2014], No. 1, Art. 5
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol51/iss1/5
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEw
or progress in prison, exceptional family circumstances, a verified
opportunity for employment, or information that was not previously
considered by the Board.226 Although this list is not exhaustive and,
arguably, "information not previously considered by the Board" could
include evidence of innocence, innocence is not specifically
highlighted. 227  States' failure to identify innocence as an
extraordinary circumstance is just one example of how states have
failed to remodel their clemency frameworks to account for
clemency's post-Herrera innocence role.
b. General References to Innocence
There are states, however, that do reference innocence as part of
their clemency processes. For instance, New York considers pardons
when no other adequate administrative or legal remedy is available
and when there is "overwhelming and convincing proof of innocence
not available at the time of conviction." 228 Pardons are available in
Georgia in two specific instances, one of which is "complete
innocence;"229 the administrative board in Georgia "ha[s] the authority
to pardon any person convicted of a crime who is subsequently
determined to be innocent of said crime."230 In Alabama, persons
under sentence who have not yet completed three years of successful
parole may apply for a pardon based on innocence, but this process
requires approval from the sentencing court or prosecuting District
Attorney.231 In Louisiana, applicants with a life sentence may bypass
the fifteen-year service rule and apply for clemency when they have
226. Id.
227. See id.
228. Executive Clemency, N.Y. STATE DIVISION OF PAROLE,
https://www.parole.ny.gov/clemency.html (last visited May 18, 2014).
229. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-9-39(d) (West, Westlaw through Acts 343 to 669 of
the 2014 Reg. Sess.); see also FY2008 Annual Report, STATE OF GA. STATE BOARD
OF PARDONS & PAROLES 20 (2008), http://pap.georgia.gov/sites/
pap.georgia.gov/filesAnnualReports/08-AnnualReport.pdf.
230. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-9-39(d) (West, Westlaw through Acts 343 to 669 of
the 2014 Reg. Sess.).
231. ALA. CODE § 15-22-36(c) (West, Westlaw through Act 2014-457 of the
2014 Reg. Sess.).
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sufficient evidence to show they would not have been found guilty if
the new evidence had been introduced at trial.232
c. Innocence Specific Procedures
Some states have carved out specific clemency procedures that
focus on innocence claims. In Montana, for example, pardons may be
granted for applicants who "satisfactorily prove innocence of a crime
for which the individual has served time" 233 or who "submit[] newly
discovered evidence showing complete justification or non-guilt on
the part of the individual."234 Additionally, applicants in Montana
who prove "by overwhelming evidence that the individual is innocent
of a crime for which the individual was convicted" can be
recommended for commutation. 235 In North Carolina, a "pardon of
innocence" is granted either when an individual has been convicted
and the criminal charges are subsequently dismissed or when the
individual has been erroneously convicted, imprisoned, and later
found innocent.236  Tennessee utilizes a clemency "exoneration"
procedure,237 through which the Governor gives serious deliberation
to applications that demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence,
"after consideration of the facts, circumstances and any newly
discovered evidence [that] the Petitioner did not commit the crime for
232. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:572 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.).
233. MONT. ADMIN. R. 20.25.901A(1)(a) (West, Westlaw through Issue 12 of
the 2014 Mont. Admin. Register, dated June 30, 2014).
234. Id. at R. 20.25.901A(1)(b).
235. Id. at R. 20.25.901A(2)(a).
236. See North Carolina Glossary of Terms, OFFICE OF EXEC. CLEMENCY,
http://www.doc.state.nc.us/clemency/glossary.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2014); N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-149 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess. of the Gen.
Assemb.). The case of the Wilmington Ten showcases this facility. See Steve
Almasy, North Carolina Governor Pardons "Wilmington 10" (Jan 1, 2013),
CNN.COM, http://edition.cnn.com/2012/12/31/justice/north-carolina-wilmington-
10/; Joy-Ann Reid, North Carolina Governor Pardons "Wilmington 10, " THE GRIO
(Dec. 31, 2012 3:22 PM), http://thegrio.com/2012/12/31/north-carolina-governor-
pardons-wilmington-ten/2/.
237. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-27-109 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Second
Reg. Sess.).
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which the Petitioner was convicted."238 Clark McMillan and James
Green were both exonerated by Tennessee Governor Phil Bredesen
through this procedure. In McMillan's case, DNA evidence proved he
was innocent of a rape and robbery for which he had spent twenty-two
years in prison.239 Green was pardoned, after serving two years for
the abduction and groping of a child, after the victim recanted her
testimony and the District Attorney dropped the charges. 240 Texas
also specifically allows for pardons based on innocence, which
exonerate the applicant and erase his or her conviction(s).24' "In order
to consider a pardon for innocence, the Texas Board of Pardons and
Paroles requires either evidence of actual innocence from at least two
trial officials; or the findings of fact and conclusions of law from the
district judge in a state habeas action indicating actual innocence." 242
Alyson Dinsmore argues that clemency, in its current form, "is an
inadequate means of protecting against wrongful executions," labeling
it a "meaningless ritual."243 While it is apparent that innocent inmates
face a plethora of obstacles during their quest for relief via clemency,
it is also evident that some states have taken a measure of positive
action. Still, states have not yet adopted a consistent approach to
building clemency frameworks that satisfy their responsibilities under
Herrera-to be the "fail safe" of the criminal justice system and the
final identifier of wrongful convictions-in a meaningful way.
Whether the result of legal mandates or the preference of
individual executives, innocence-specific procedures generally arise
only after the legal system has relieved a defendant. Consequently,
238. Application for Exoneration, STATE OF TENN. BOARD OF PAROLE 1,
http://www.tn.gov/bop/Docs/BP%200247%20Exoneration%20Application.pdf (last
revised Oct. 2013).
239. See Case Profile of Clark McMillan, INNOCENCE PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/ClarkMcMillan.php (last visited May 16,
2014).
240. James Green, THE NAT'L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (Before June
2012),
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3258.
241. What is a Pardon Based on Innocence?, TEX. BOARD OF PARDONS &
PAROLES, http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/bpp/exec-clem/Pardon-forInnocence.html
(last updated April 1, 2013).
242. Pardon for Innocence, TEX. DEPARTMENT OF CRIM. JUSTICE 2,
https://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/bpp/forms/PFI%2OApp.pdf (last revised Jan. 11, 2010).
243. Dinsmore, supra note 181, at 1825.
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the extent to which clemency practices and decisions can be judicially
reviewed is crucial.
III. AMERICAN COURTS' RESPONSES TO DUE PROCESS CHALLENGES TO
CLEMENCY FRAMEWORKS
Five years after Herrera,244 the USSC considered whether
clemency was an "integral" part of Ohio's system for adjudicating
guilt or innocence and, therefore, deserving of due process
protection. 245 Rejecting the Petitioner's claims-and seemingly
sidelining its decision in Herrera-the USSC determined that
clemency proceedings "are not part of the trial or even of the
adjudicatory process."246 The Court explained that clemency
proceedings "do not determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant,
and are not intended primarily to enhance the reliability of the trial
process." 247  In so holding, the USSC affirmed that clemency
decisions were not the "business of the courts." 248
The Court split, however, with regard to whether procedural due
process rights attach to clemency proceedings. 249  Chief Justice
Rehnquist, joined by Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas,
concluded that the Due Process Clause provides no constitutional
safeguards as to clemency procedures. 250 Justice O'Connor, however,
joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter, concluded that,
because a death row prisoner retains some life interest before
execution, "some minimal procedural safeguards apply to clemency
proceedings," even if the power to grant clemency is solely entrusted
to the executive.251  Justice O'Connor reasoned that judicial
intervention might be "warranted in the face of a scheme whereby the
state official flipped a coin to determine whether to grant clemency or
in a case where the state arbitrarily denied a prisoner any access to its
244. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
245. Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272 (1997).
246. Id. at 284 (plurality opinion).
247. Id. (plurality opinion).
248. Id. (plurality opinion) (quoting Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452
U.S. 458, 464 (1981)).
249. See generally id. (plurality opinion).
250. Id. at 285 (plurality opinion).
251. Id. at 289 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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clemency process." 252  Justice Stevens concurred, arguing that it
would be wrong for clemency processes "infected by bribery, personal
or political animosity, or the deliberate fabrication of false evidence"
to be constitutionally acceptable. 253 Subsequently, the vast majority
of courts have interpreted Woodard to mean that minimal due process
protections extend beyond clemency applications arising out of death
penalty cases and attach to all clemency proceedings. There is no
agreement, however, on what exactly constitutes "minimal" due
process in the context of clemency proceedings.
Since Woodard, defendants have made a variety of due process
challenges in relation to state clemency frameworks. These have
included: (A) innocence related challenges; (B) challenges related to
the provision of assistance for preparing clemency applications; (C)
challenges to state clemency procedures; and (D) challenges related to
the role or conduct of state officials. This section provides a brief
overview of courts' responses to such claims.
A. Innocence Related Challenges
Some inmates have challenged clemency proceedings by way of
arguments related to their claim of innocence. In Corliss v.
Pennsylvania Board of Pardons & Parole, Corliss challenged the
Board's decision to deny him parole, alleging that, in light of
exculpatory DNA evidence, the denial violated his Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights.254 The court rejected his claim, stating
252. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
253. Id. at 290 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Although recognizing that a death
row prisoner "maintains a residual life interest, e.g., in not being summarily
executed by prison guards," Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that a death row prisoner
cannot use this interest to mount a procedural due process challenge to a clemency
determination. Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 281 (1997)
(plurality opinion). In addition, Chief Justice Rehnquist found that a death row
prisoner has "no substantive expectation of clemency" because, under Ohio law,
clemency lies within the discretion of the executive. Id. at 283 (plurality opinion).
Further, Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected the argument that Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S.
387 (1985), creates a "second strand" of procedural due process protection
encompassing clemency proceedings because they are not "an integral part of the . .
. system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant." Woodard,
523 U.S. at 283-85 (plurality opinion) (quoting Evitts, 469 U.S. at 393).
254. Corliss v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole, No. 4:CV-0501817,
2006 WL 2927270, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 11, 2006).
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that Corliss presented no basis for his conclusion that DNA evidence
proved his innocence; 255 the fact that the trial court properly rejected
the DNA evidence as inconclusive illustrated that Corliss's claim
lacked merit. 256 However, deference to trial court findings concerning
exculpatory evidence can be problematic. As one commentator states:
Exaggerating the weaknesses of a prisoner's exculpatory evidence
not only undermines the integrity of the judicial process, but it may
also make it more difficult for the prisoner to obtain clemency.
Once a court declares that the ... standard [for review] has not
been met, a governor fearful of controversy may find it irresistibly
tempting to take cover behind the court's declaration and say that
he or she, like the court, finds the prisoner's exculpatory evidence
unconvincing. It certainly would not be the first time that a
governor presented with a difficult clemency petition has sought
shelter behind a court's refusal to grant the prisoner's request for
relief.257
In 2008, the court in McKithen v. Brown engaged in possibly the most
protracted discussion of any court regarding innocence claims and
clemency proceedings.258 McKithen, who had been convicted of the
attempted murder of his wife, petitioned the court for access to DNA
testing of a knife that might exonerate him.259 One question the court
considered was whether McKithen's liberty interest in meaningful
access to existing executive clemency mechanisms encompassed
access to the knife introduced as evidence against him at trial.260
Judge John Gleeson of the United States District Court, referring to
Herrera's description of clemency as a "fail safe," held:
[There is] strong support for my conclusion that the right of
meaningful access to existing clemency mechanisms entails the
right to certain evidence of innocence. Though clemency
255. Id. at *5.
2 5 6. Id.
257. Todd E. Pettys, Killing Roger Coleman Habeas, Finality, and the
Innocence Gap, 48 WM. & MARY L. REv. 2313, 2361 (2007).
258. Mckithen v. Brown, 565 F. Supp. 2d 440 (E.D. N.Y. 2008), rev'd, 626
F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2010).
259. Id. at 443.
260. Id. at 453.
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proceedings are not exclusively or even primarily "error-
correction" proceedings, and often turn not on a revisitation of the
facts underlying a conviction, but on an analysis of a defendant's
contrition and personality, they nevertheless have one significant,
even if discretionary, error-correcting function: they are the last
resort for the wrongfully convicted.26
Judge Gleeson concluded that the criminal justice system continues to
"grapple with the questions of which avenues of relief remain open to
those advancing claims that they are wrongfully convicted." 262 He
noted that while some states offer statutory mechanisms to set aside
convictions based on newly discovered evidence, it was unclear
whether there was a constitutional right to do so. 263 Therefore, Judge
Gleeson reasoned:
The remaining resort for the innocent convicted is to avail
themselves of the opportunity to petition for clemency in whatever
form the state has authorized. States may debate the value of
expanding or contracting any of these avenues; in light of the
tremendous probative power of DNA evidence, it may be wise to
strike a different balance between accuracy and finality in cases
where it is available. 264
In spite of Judge Gleeson's detailed assessment, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals overruled the decision in 2010.265 Although
acknowledging that the district court paid "careful attention to
precedent" and employed a "quality of ... reasoning, which proved to
be intricate and, in many ways, persuasive," the circuit court found
261. Id. at 471.
262. Id. at 493.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 495.
265. McKithen v. Brown, 626 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2010). The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals relied largely on the USSC's decision in District Attorney's Office
v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52 (2009), which was delivered after the District Court
considered McKithen. McKithen, 626 F.3d at 145. In that case, the USSC held that
Osborne (who raised similar issues to McKithen) was not entitled to DNA evidence
in post-conviction proceedings as a matter of either substantive or procedural due
process. Id. at 151. The Second Circuit essentially applied that decision to the
district court's ruling that McKithen was entitled to conduct post-conviction DNA
testing as a matter of procedural due process. Id. at 152-54.
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McKithen had no residual due process liberty interest in meaningful
access to state clemency mechanisms. 26 6 In so holding, the circuit
court relied heavily on the USSC's 2009 decision in District
Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52 (2009),267 which raised
similar issues. There, the USSC found that a prisoner had no liberty
interest with respect to "any procedures available to vindicate an
interest in state clemency," explaining that clemency is "inherently
discretionary and subject to the whim, or grace, of the decision-maker;
it is, in other words, a form of relief to which a prisoner has no
right." 26 8 As such, the circuit court in McKithen explained:
Because there is no liberty interest in receiving clemency, the
Osborne Court rejected the existence of any subsidiary liberty
interest regarding the adequacy of state procedures capable of
granting that relief. Thus, the District Court's holding that a
prisoner has a liberty interest in meaningful access to state
clemency mechanisms does not survive Osborne.269
These cases demonstrate that the relationship between clemency
and innocence has crept into legal challenges. The district court's
decision in McKithen, and to some extent the circuit court's
acknowledgement of its persuasiveness despite overruling it,
demonstrates a glimmer of understanding that the courts should (albeit
that they cannot or will not) intervene where clemency or legal
frameworks do not facilitate access to unimpeachable evidence of
innocence, such as DNA evidence. However, Corliss, the circuit
court's decision in McKithen, and the USSC's decision in Osborne
266. Id.
267. Osborne was decided after the district court's decision and whilst the case
was pending before the Second Circuit. See id. at 145, 152-54.
268. Osborne, 557 U.S. at 68; McKithen, 626 F.3d at 151 ("The Osborne
Court concluded that a prisoner has no liberty interest with respect to "any
procedures available to vindicate an interest in state clemency" because clemency
is inherently discretionary and subject to whim, or grace, of the decisionmaker; it is,
in other words, a form of relief to which a prisoner has no right.").
269. McKithen, 626 F.3d at 152; see Osborne, 557 U.S. at 68 (regarding
McKithen's due process claim concerning access to DNA evidence, although there
is no constitutionally cognizable residual liberty interest in obtaining clemency and
no subsidiary interest in the adequacy of state clemency mechanisms, the Osborne
Court recognized that a prisoner may retain a state-created "liberty interest in
demonstrating his innocence with new evidence under state law").
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undermine this point and further the legal system's general allegiance
to finality over accuracy 2 70 by encouraging clemency boards to defer
to trial court determinations and foreclosing the notion that defendants
have a liberty interest in meaningful access to clemency. Moreover,
these decisions demonstrate the general resistance to claims
concerning access to exculpatory evidence.
Although the following cases do not relate specifically to
innocence claims, they further demonstrate how narrowly Woodard's
minimal due process standard is applied and illustrate courts'
unwillingness to interfere in state clemency proceedings. This lack of
judicial oversight allows for even the most suspect clemency
proceedings to pass constitutional muster and potentially shields the
inadequate examination of innocence claims in state clemency
proceedings.
B. Challenges Related to the Provision ofAssistance for Preparing
Clemency Applications
Some inmates have argued that minimal due process requires they
be provided with a certain level of assistance when preparing
clemency applications. For example, in the 2006 case Lewis v. State
of Alaska, Lewis argued that due process required the State provide
her with an examination by a private doctor whose report she could
use to support her application for clemency. 27 1 The Alaska Supreme
Court assumed that Lewis had a "significant interest" in the ability to
generate information to support her clemency application and that the
State's denial could have the effect of denying her access to
"potentially important relief."272 However, because Lewis had not
"demonstrated any real-world value of gaining access to a private
doctor," the court found there was no denial of due process and
rejected Lewis's claims. 2 73 The court stated, "Lewis did not attempt
to rely on any readily available information to make out a showing
270. See Carrie Sperling, When Finality and Innocence Collide, in
CONTROVERSIES IN INNOCENCE CASES IN AMERICA 141 (Sarah Cooper ed., 2014)
(noting finality has been a compelling goal in the American criminal justice system).
271. Lewis v. State, 139 P.3d 1266, 1269 (Alaska 2006).
272. Id. at 1270.
273. Id.
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suggesting that she has a medical condition that might justify
clemency" or might qualify as an "exceptional circumstance." 274
In Baze v. Parker, Baze, a death row inmate, challenged the
Kentucky Department's denial of his unfettered access to prison
personnel. Baze had sought a court order permitting him to interview
prison staff whom he thought could support his application for
clemency. 275 Regarding the propriety of such an order, Baze argued
that federal courts have the power to order third-party compliance
with clemency related investigations.276 The Sixth Circuit found that
"[s]uch a broad oversight power is in tension with the longstanding
principle that we do not sit as super appeals courts over state
commutation proceedings." 277 In response to Baze's argument that
meaningful access to clemency included a right to call upon federal
courts to supervise the mechanics of state proceedings, the court
bluntly stated, "we cannot infer a Congressional intent to interfere
with state proceedings to such a remarkable extent."278
Courts' unwillingness to compel states to actively facilitate the
preparation of clemency applications emphasizes the uninhibited
nature of the clemency power. Moreover, courts appear generally
unwilling to interfere with state clemency procedures, whether or not
the clemency application is based on a claim of innocence. Although
Lewis and Baze are not innocence cases, presumably, courts would
similarly approach claims advanced by innocent inmates in cases
where states have refused to assist innocents in gathering evidence
typically utilized to challenge a conviction, such as lay witness or
expert testimony and forensic evidence. Of course, courts could
retreat from the current precedent and expand the district court's
approach in McKithen beyond unimpeachable DNA evidence.
However, as attractive as such a change in direction would be, it is
unlikely; this is because McKithen's holding was, in effect, very
narrow, given that only five to ten percent of cases involve DNA
evidence. 279
274. Id.
275. Baze v. Parker, 632 F.3d 338, 340 (6th Cir. 2011).
276. Id. at 342.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 343.
279. See INNOCENCE PROJECT, Non-DNA Exonerations, supra note 205.
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C. Challenges to State Clemency Procedures
Another argument inmates have advanced is that state clemency
procedures are not in compliance with Woodard's minimal due
process standard. In Faulder v. Texas Board of Pardons & Paroles,
Faulder claimed the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles violated due
process by providing inadequate notice of issues it would consider for
clemency, acting in secrecy, refusing to hold hearings, giving no
reasons for its decisions, and failing to keep records of its actions. 280
The Fifth Circuit labeled Faulder's latter claims regarding
transparency "meritless." Interpreting narrowly Justice O'Connor's
view in Woodard regarding when judicial intervention is warranted,
the court explained that Woodard's "low threshold of judicial
reviewability is based on the facts that pardon and commutation
decisions are not traditionally the business of courts and that they are
subject to the ultimate discretion of the executive power." 281 The court
found that Texas clemency procedures did not exhibit the "extreme"
nature of a coin toss or arbitrary denial of access to the clemency
process, and thus satisfied Woodard's minimal due process
standard.282 In conclusion, the court noted, "[p]rocedural due process
is an inherently flexible concept. And Woodard emphasizes that extra
flexibility is required when, as here, the criminal process has reached
an end and a highly individualized and merciful decision like
executive clemency is at issue."283
Texas's clemency procedures have been highlighted as suspect
numerous times since Faulder.284  Accordingly, Professor Daniel
Kobil considers it regrettable that courts have held "the deeply flawed
Texas clemency process satisfies the Woodard standard." 2 85
Similarly, in Fugate v. Board of Pardons & Paroles, the Superior
Court of Georgia denied an emergency motion for injunctive relief
after Fugate argued his due process rights were violated by the State
280. Faulder v. Tex. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 178 F.3d 343, 344 (5th Cir.
1999).
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 343.
284. For instance, in the aforementioned cases of Hank Skinner and Cameron
Todd Willingham. See Okun, supra note 149; Grann, supra note 13.
285. Kobil, Unforgiving Times, supra note 1, at 237.
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Board's refusal to disclose the information that would be relied on
during its clemency decision and its reliance on untrustworthy and
inaccurate information. 286  The court rejected Fugate's claim and,
interpreting Woodard, held that judicial intervention is only warranted
when a decision-maker relied on "admittedly false information." 287
In Sepulvado v. Louisiana Board ofPardons & Parole, Sepulvado
argued that the State denied him minimal due process because
Louisiana's clemency procedures did not guarantee a clemency
hearing. 288 Rejecting this claim, the court found there are no specific
requirements that clemency proceedings must follow in order to
achieve due process compliance. 289 Louisiana permitted all inmates to
apply for clemency and to provide a variety of detail, including the
reason for clemency, at the initial application stage, which the court
held did not fall below the Woodard standard.2 90 Therefore, it was
irrelevant that, unless a hearing was granted, an inmate could not
provide any further information. 2 91 The court highlighted, however,
that Louisiana procedure included an exception to this bar on
additional evidence, which allowed certain inmates to introduce
evidence demonstrating actual innocence. 292 Relying on its earlier
decision in Faulder, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded,
"Sepulvado had full access to the clemency process, and the Board
considered his application before denying him a clemency hearing.
Under the highly deferential Faulder standard of review, Sepulvado
does not state a due-process-denial claim for which relief can be
granted." 293
Again, in Gilreath v. State Board of Pardons & Paroles, a Florida
clemency process was found not to breach the "minimal" Woodard
standard, despite the fact that one of the Board members who voted
286. Fugate v. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, No. 2002CV56978, 2002 WL
34185124, at *1, *2 (Ga. Super. Aug. 14, 2002).
287. Id. at *2 (discussing Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, 523 U.S.
272, 289 (1997)).
288. Sepulvado v. La. Bd. of Pardons & Parole, 171 F. App'x. 470, 472 (5th
Cir. 2006).
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 473.
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against clemency was absent from an earlier meeting where people
spoke in favor of clemency.294 The constitutionality of the process
was upheld because, prior to voting, the Board member at issue saw a
written file and reviewed a summary of the oral presentations. 295
In the 2013 case Mann v. Palmer, Mann, who was scheduled to be
executed on March 1, 2013,296 argued that he was denied due process
when Florida procedure permitted the Governor, before signing the
death warrant, to consider an updated clemency investigation without
giving Mann an opportunity to be heard and represented by counsel in
those proceedings. 297 The majority of the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals found this procedure did not violate due process, as the State
had conducted a full clemency hearing-which included notice and
the opportunity to participate and have the representation of counsel-
in 1985.298 Judge Martin dissented in part, finding the due process
issue in Mann's case unusual because the 1985 clemency proceeding,
although relating to the same underlying conviction, addressed a
different sentence of death. 299 Notwithstanding the full clemency
investigation in 1985, Mann claimed he never had a clemency
proceeding on the now pertinent death sentence imposed in 1990 after
he was resentenced by a newly empanelled jury. Mann further
claimed that neither he nor his counsel had been advised that the
Governor had conducted an updated clemency investigation and
additional clemency proceedings and that he was denied access to
records of those proceedings. Judge Martin, troubled by Mann's
claims and wary of the Herrera decision, stated:
I understand Mr. Mann to be arguing that he has arbitrarily been
denied any access to Florida's clemency process for the specific
sentence of death set to be carried out this week. As I mentioned,
this argument gives me pause. That is because the Supreme Court
294. Gilreath v. State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 273 F.3d 932, 934 (11th Cir.
2001).
295. Id. at 934.
296. Mann v. Palmer, 713 F.3d 1306, 1306 (11th Cir. 2013).
297. Id. at 1316.
298. Id. at 1317-18 (quoting Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, 523
U.S. 272, 290 (1997)).
299. Id. at 1318 (Martin, J., dissenting).
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has acknowledged that clemency proceedings have an important
role to play in the administration of the death penalty. 300
Unprepared to label Mann's claim futile, Judge Martin concluded that
"Mr. Mann will certainly suffer irreparable injury if his execution is
carried out, I would proceed with caution." 301
These cases demonstrate that courts are applying Woodard's due
process protection very narrowly, underscoring, again, the expansive
and legally unchecked nature of the clemency power. Although courts
mention the "fail safe" function of clemency, this characteristic, as
well as any reference to innocence, is left unexpanded. Courts appear
to be more concerned about mere access to clemency procedures than
the substance of these frameworks. As Kobil observes, "Woodard is
viewed [by the courts] as requiring states to provide very little in the
way of process." 302
D. Challenges Related to the Role or Conduct ofState Officials
Inmates have also argued that the role or conduct of state officials
involved in the clemency process violated the Woodard due process
standard. For instance, inmates have challenged state clemency
boards with members under investigation for impropriety while
considering clemency applications. In Gilreath, an inmate claimed his
due process rights were violated when two members of the state
clemency board were under investigation by the State Attorney
General's Office at the time his clemency application was denied; the
investigations, Gilreath argued, gave rise to an appearance of
impropriety because the board members might have voted to deny
clemency in order to curry favor with the Attorney General.303 The
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Gilreath's claim, noting
there was no evidence that: the Attorney General regularly advocated
300. Id. at 1318-19 (Martin, J., dissenting) (citing Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S.
390, 411-12 (1993) (recognizing that "[c]lemency is deeply rooted in our Anglo-
American tradition of law, and is the historic remedy for preventing miscarriages of
justice where judicial process has been exhausted") (internal citation and footnote
omitted)).
301. Id. at 1319 (Martin, J., dissenting).
302. Kobil, Unforgiving Times, supra note 1, at 237.
303. Gilreath v. State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 273 F.3d 932, 934 (11th Cir.
2001).
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for or against clemency; anyone familiar with the State's clemency
procedure would believe the Attorney General's Office was an
advocate in the clemency proceeding; or indicated the result desired
by the Attorney General for Gilreath's clemency proceeding.
Moreover, the court concluded that the mere "appearance" of
impropriety would not violate due process. 304
The 2001 case of Parker v. State Board of Pardons & Paroles is a
more extreme example. 305  There, Parker not only claimed that the
investigation of two active board members-including the
Chairman-for criminal wrongdoing violated due process, 306 but
further asserted that relief was warranted in light of the Board
Chairman's statement that "[n]o one on death row [will] ever get
clemency as long as [I am] Chairman of the Board," coupled with the
Chairman's unique control over the voting process. 307 The Eleventh
Circuit rejected both claims, relying on Gilreath's holding that an
appearance of impropriety does not violate due process, and applying
Woodard's low threshold for due process compliance. The court
reasoned that, assuming the Chairman's statement was actually made,
the three-year time lapse between the statement and Parker's
clemency proceedings was a "long enough period to allow [the
Chairman] to reevaluate his position so that he could now fairly
review Parker's clemency application." 308  The court additionally
noted the Chairman's testimony indicated that he "now has an open
mind and listens to all of the clemency cases that come before him
prior to voting on them." 309 As such, the court affirmed the district
court's denial of Parker's requested relief.310
304. Id.
305. Parker v. State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 275 F.3d 1032 (11th Cir. 2001).
306. Id. at 1034.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 1037.
309. Id.
310. Id. Circuit Judge Barkett was troubled by this reasoning to a certain
extent. In his special concurrence, Judge Barkett stated:
The district court's conclusion in this case is based on its acceptance of
Chairman Ray's testimony that "I have an open mind and I listen to every
one of them." Because I cannot say that the Court's acceptance of this
testimony was clear error, I concur in the majority's decision. However, I
am deeply troubled by the unusual nature of the court's conclusion. On
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Other inmates have challenged the Governor's role or conduct in
clemency proceedings. In Duvall v. Keating, for example, the
Governor of Oklahoma had made a statement similar to the statement
at issue in Parker, namely that he would not grant clemency for
murderers. 3 11 The court rejected Duvall's due process claim because,
since Duvall was never recommended for clemency by the Oklahoma
clemency board, the Governor did not engage in the clemency
proceeding. 3 12
The issue in Bacon v. Lee was whether Woodard's minimal due
process protection included an inmate's right to have his or her
clemency request reviewed by an executive possessing the level of
impartiality required of a judge presiding over an adjudicatory
proceeding. 3 13 The court ruled that it did not, stating:
We do not believe Woodard intended to repudiate entirely the
cardinal principle that clemency decisions are normally not a matter
to be litigated in courts of law.... Instead, we conclude ... that
state clemency procedures generally comport with due process
when a prisoner is afforded notice and the opportunity to participate
in clemency procedures, and the clemency decision, though
substantively a discretionary one, is not reached by means of a
procedure such as a coin toss. 314
In the 2013 case of Schad v. Brewer, a death-row inmate argued
that the Governor's Office placed undue influence on members of the
the one hand, the district court assumed, for purposes of decision, that
Chairman Ray made the statement that "No one on death row [will] ever
get clemency as long as [I am] Chairman of the Board." But it did not so
find as a fact. At the same time, the court found that Ray, who denied
ever making the statement, was credible when he said that he could now
entertain clemency petitions from death row inmates with an open mind.
As it stands, the court has effectively assumed that Ray lied when he said
he never made the initial statement, but was sincere when he said he could
be neutral. It is troubling that the district court did not explore the
question of Ray's openness in light of questions involving his assumed
original bias.
Id. at 1037 (Barkett, J., concurring).
311. Duvall v. Keating, 162 F.3d 1058, 1060 (D. Ariz. 1998).
312. Id. at 1061.
313. Bacon v. Lee, 549 S.E.2d 840 (N.C. 2001).
314. Id. at 850.
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Arizona Board of Executive Clemency to vote against clemency,
particularly when voting on clemency for high profile inmates, in
violation of due process.3 15 A number of previous Board members
provided evidence that suggested they were not reappointed because
the Governor was "unhappy" with their votes in certain cases. 3 16 The
court rejected Schad's claims, holding that "even if [the previous
Board members'] impressions were accurate, this does not
demonstrate that the current Board members are incapable of
objectivity or are biased." 3 17 That said, the court's approach did differ
slightly from that taken in Bacon. The Shad court seemed prepared to
assume that "minimal due process applicable to clemency proceedings
pursuant to Woodard includes access to an impartial decision
maker." 3 18
Cases challenging the role or conduct of state officials during the
clemency process further demonstrate how courts are applying
Woodard narrowly and, seemingly, are willing to overlook the biases
of decision-makers. Notably, courts are reluctant to demand the same
objectivity of individuals making clemency decisions as is demanded
of court officials-even where applications are based on innocence
claims-notwithstanding that these individuals are charged with a role
equivalent to that of adjudicating guilt and innocence.
Overall, with respect to due process and related doctrine, some
courts acknowledge clemency's "innocence" role, following Herrera;
however, most courts continue to underscore that clemency is not "the
business of the courts," and are, as a result, antipathetic to inmates'
claims. As noted by Kobil, "[t]hus far, virtually every challenge to
state clemency procedures based on Woodard has been summarily
rejected by lower courts, despite allegations of serious
irregularities. "319 As the cases discussed above demonstrate, most
courts are applying Woodard's due process protections narrowly and
are focusing on mere access to clemency proceedings rather than the
substance of clemency frameworks. For instance, proceedings tainted
315. Schad v. Brewer, No. CV-13-01962-PHX-ROS, 2013 WL 5524547, at
*1-*2 (D. Ariz. Oct. 4, 2013).
316. Id. at *3, *9.
317. Id. at *9.
318. Id. at *8.
319. Kobil, Unforgiving Times, supra note 1, at 235-36.
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by the appearance of impropriety, partiality, and bias, as well as those
lacking in transparency and/or infrastructures for supporting inmates'
development of their clemency applications have each failed to trigger
judicial intervention. Presently, therefore, the sanguine view of
clemency, as adopted by the USSC in Herrera, does not seem "to
comport with the practical realities of the clemency process," 320 an
actuality that has been "frankly acknowledged by lower courts." 321
CONCLUSION
Clemency is an integral part of the American criminal justice
system. However, like those before them, American executives
primarily utilize the clemency power for political expedience rather
than to remedy wrongful convictions. To that extent, the USSC's
decision in Herrera catapulted clemency into a role it had never truly
served.
The Innocence Movement is now in full stride-with more than
fourteen hundred exonerations listed on the National Registry of
Exonerations, over three hundred and twenty of which have been
proven conclusively by post-conviction DNA evidence.322
Consequently, the extent to which clemency is fit to fulfill its
"innocence" role is now critical. This article urges that there are
serious deficiencies in the operation of clemency systems across
America, particularly from the viewpoint of innocents. In addition to
the lack of historical precedent for remedying innocence claims,
current state clemency frameworks showcase a myriad of obstacles to
the meaningful assessment of innocence claims, such a lack of
transparency, imbalanced administrative board compositions, and
barriers to meaningful review, such as high eligibility thresholds and
unfavorable application procedures. These obstacles are exacerbated
by the minimal constitutional protection afforded to clemency
320. Id. at 233.
321. Id.
322. See Browse the National Registry of Exonerations, THE NAT'L REGISTRY
OF EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/
about.aspx (last visited Oct. 1, 2014) (select "DNA" drop down menu; then follow
"Y" hyperlink). For the total number of DNA exonerations to date, see The
Innocence Project, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/ (last
visited Nov. 16, 2011).
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applicants under Woodard-a standard which courts have routinely
applied narrowly, focusing on mere access to clemency procedures
rather than the substance of state frameworks. Moreover, courts
demonstrate clear reluctance to interfere with even the most
troublesome clemency practices.
Fortunately, there is some acknowledgement of clemency's
innocence role under Herrera by states and courts, as evidenced by
innocence-focused procedures in states like Montana, North Carolina,
Tennessee, and Texas and by a few cautious acknowledgements in
judicial decisions. Still, more must be done. While it is beyond the
scope of this article to make detailed recommendations, several
suggestions include: (1) developing innocence-focused clemency
procedures and innocence-based clemency applications in each state;
(2) encouraging clemency boards to conduct more transparent and
expansive reviews of innocence applications and to reject trial court
findings in appropriate cases; and (3) applying a broader interpretation
of Woodard's due process requirements. 323
Clemency is a hostile environment for innocents. Given the
USSC's decision in Herrera and the ever-increasing tally of
exonerations, action must be taken to ensure clemency applications-
especially those based on innocence claims-are fairly and effectively
reviewed.
323. See generally Kobil, Unforgiving Times, supra note 1 (providing
suggestions for reform in a capital case context).
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